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In 1945, Japan was bombed into submission by the dropping of two atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This ended a period in Japan’s history notorious for 
aggression, atrocities, and the victimisation of East Asian and captive peoples. For 
seven decades, the country has navigated through the memories of a traumatic past. 
This has created a variety of collective memories which have been shaped and 
reshaped through places, symbols, museums, public debate, and politics. This study 
investigates the collective memories portrayed at Yasukuni Shrine and the Hiroshima 
Peace Memorial Park, with attention given to the associated Yūshūkan, and Peace 
Memorial museums. The two sites present markedly different narratives of the war and 
show evidence of historical revisionism by the altering of content in order to align with 
their respective objectives. This has produced significant collective forgetting of the 
unsavoury aspects to Japan’s past, while creating an identity which is closely linked to 
the notion of nonviolence. Analysis of public debate surrounding Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe’s visit to Yasukuni in 2013, and President Barack Obama’s visit to 
Hiroshima in 2016, showed that the collective memories represented at each site, while 
contested, are largely effective in producing a sense of national identity among 
Japanese people. The two sites thus function in tandem, despite contrasting displays of 
the war, in their forgetting and eliciting of sympathy and gratitude to the sacrifices of 
the war dead. While contestation of collective memory remains, the two versions 
analysed in this study show that they are both significant to the production of pride in 
being Japanese, and in shaping Japan’s internal and external identity.   
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework 
 
“Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood without 





Aims and Methodology 
 
Japan’s relationship with its wartime past has been one of contentious debate within 
the country and overseas for many years. The defeat of the Japanese in 1945 and its 
associated shame has led to the development of a number of collective war memories. 
This study analyses the collective memories expressed through two sites of war 
memorial in Japan; the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine. 
The former has become an internationally recognized symbol for the preservation of 
peace and elimination of conflict, while the latter remains a contentious national 
symbol to the valour and grandeur of Japan’s imperial past. The museums associated 
with these two sites offer two differing narratives of the Asia-Pacific War. What is 
represented and what is absent in each site affects and shapes collective memory 
among the Japanese population. This in turn contributes to a sense of national 
identity.  
 
With moves in recent years by the Japanese government to reinterpret the country’s 
pacifist constitution, Japan’s post-war national identity is being challenged (Basu, 
2016). By investigating the different historical narratives portrayed at each site using 
collective memory theory, this study aims to shed light on how the nation’s collective 
memory shapes a sense of national belonging; looking specifically at symbols within 
each site, the content of their respective museums, visitor comments, and public 
debate around visits by politicians. In-depth analysis of the complexity of Japan’s 
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collective war memory is shown to be lacking, thus more work in this significant field 
of research will contribute to a better understanding of Japan’s identity politics. This 
study will use both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to collate data for 
analysis. The author’s Japanese language ability has enabled translations of selected 
Japanese materials and the employment of Japanese sources to produce an objective 





Due to the parameters of this project and the geographical location of the author 
outside of Japan, case studies of only two sites of collective memory have been 
conducted. This has allowed for a more in-depth analysis of each site than could be 
afforded if multiple sites were to be investigated. The choice of locations was made due 
to the politicised nature of them in Japanese society.  
 
The study of collective memory relates to the subjectivity of the individual and/or 
group thus variables such as background, age, education, and family all influence how 
memories of the past will be viewed. Consequently, the study of interpreting collective 
memory will invariably produce results of an abstract nature. With this in mind, this 
thesis aims to dispel certain common perceptions of the two chosen sites in order to 
uncover the contested nature of the collective memories which they represent. It is 
noteworthy to mention, therefore, that consideration be given to the notional nature 





There is a common belief in Western scholarship that the Japanese population suffers 
from ‘collective amnesia’ with regard to its wartime past (Stone & Hirst, 2014). This 
belief is affirmed by the supposed refusal of the Japanese government to fully 
acknowledge and apologise for the atrocities committed by their military during the 
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Asia-Pacific War. There are claims of Japan whitewashing and revising its wartime 
history and omitting certain events from history textbooks and museums (Higurashi, 
2013). Its wartime ally Germany, having reconciled with its past and acknowledging the 
atrocities committed, is often cited as an example for Japan to follow. In Germany, 
there is a widely accepted version of the war among the population which has created 
a common ‘collective memory’ of it. This is not the case for the Japanese population 
despite common Western analyses assuming so (Hashimoto, 2015). In fact, rather than 
one collective memory there is a multiplicity of collective memories which are 
represented in spatial frameworks. Comprehensive analysis of this topic is thus needed 
to ascertain more understanding of Japan’s contemporary domestic, international and 





Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo has come to signify a celebration of Japan’s Imperial past. 
This is supported by the associated Yūshūkan museum which presents a revised 
version of the Asia-Pacific war. For over 150 years, Yasukuni has served as a place to 
enshrine the souls of those who have died fighting for Japan (Takenaka, 2015). Since 
the enshrinement of fourteen Class A war criminals in 1978, it has been visited by a 
number of Japanese Prime Ministers, most recently by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 
2013 (Ravitch, 2014). These visits have created heated debate within Japan and have 
sparked harsh criticism from its East Asian neighbours (Lee, 2018). The privately-run 
shrine and museum have thus become highly politicized. The Yūshūkan museum 
displays Japan’s nationalists’ war memory and shapes a more positive view of the Asia-
Pacific war in collective memory. There is also little to no reference of Japan’s 
victimisation during the War. The displays present Japanese expansionism into Asia as 
a liberation of Asian peoples from Western Imperialism despite evidence of widespread 
subservience experienced by many occupied populations. The Japanese regimes 
installed in these occupied territories were often more brutal and severe than those of 
the previous European colonial administrations (Driscoll, 2010).  
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Conversely, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park promulgates the memory of Japan as 
the victim of the world’s first and only atomic bomb attacks to date. It promotes peace 
by showing unreservedly the morbid effects nuclear weapons can inflict on 
populations. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) World Heritage site of the Genbaku (atomic bomb) Dome now sits as a 
permanent physicalisation of the victims’ memories (Smala, 2003). Internationally, the 
site has become a symbol for the preservation of peace in global collective memory. 
The park is also the site for national commemorations on specific occasions such as 
August 6, the anniversary of the dropping of the first atomic bomb. These ceremonies 
are attended by Japanese Prime Ministers, politicians, hibakusha (atomic bomb 
survivors), citizens, as well as foreign dignitaries. In May 2016, Barack Obama became 
the first sitting American President to officially visit Hiroshima. He gave a speech at 
the Flame of Peace in the centre of the park in which his remarks reflected the 
collective memory of Hiroshima.  
 
The associated Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum has the aim to: “Spread the spirit 
of Hiroshima to entreat the realization of the total abolition of nuclear weapons and an 
eternal world peace” (Yamane, 2017). It houses detailed exhibits on the story of the 
bombing of Hiroshima through photographs, artefacts and belongings of hibakusha 
and espouses a sense of national victimhood. There is, however, little to no reference 
of Japan’s actions during the Asia-Pacific war which proceeded the dropping of the 
atomic bombs.  
 
The significance of the museums associated with both the Hiroshima Peace Memorial 
Park and Yasukuni Shrine is consequential. As institutions, the two museums are able 
to tell a narrative to the visitor. This narrative is a detailed portrayal of all that the sites 
represent. In the case of Yasukuni, this can be representations of sacrifice, bravery, 
honour, and national pride. In Hiroshima, representations of hardship, suffering, 
destruction, loss, and victimhood are often seen. These themes, however, are not 






While differing significantly in their theme and purpose, the two sites in this study are 
also complementary in their ‘forgetting’ of historical aspects of aggression and 
victimisation which portray Japan in an unsavoury light (Lee, 2018). Since the late 
1980s, alterations have taken place in both museums with much of the content also 
being displayed online (Lee, 2018). The updated and altered content demonstrates the 
fluidity of the narratives being represented at the two museums. This has coincided 
with Japanese Prime Ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine, Barack Obama’s visit to the 
Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park in 2016, a rise in Japanese nationalism, an increasingly 
defensive foreign policy by the Abe administration, and a rise in support for amending 
Article 9; the pacifist clause of the Japanese Constitution (Richter, 2016).   
 
By analysing museum content, statues and memorials, visitor comments and public 
reaction to the political leaders’ visits to the sites, this study aims to produce a better 









Collective memory is significant to understanding the role the past plays in societies. 
This in turn has an effect on a given country’s international relations. The father of 
collective memory theory, Maurice Halbwachs, argued that: “Memories are constantly 
reshaped and reconstructed by the pressure of the present” (Halbwachs & Coser, 1992, 
p. 52). As a collective, societies also possess the ability to decide what is remembered 
and what is forgotten in order to produce a coherent national identity (Forsberg, 
2003). Langenbacher (2010, p. 22) further espouses this thesis by stating that 
remembering the past provides meaning for: “…what people stand for, thereby 
generating emotional bonds, solidarity, and trust.”. This produces a sense of national 
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identity which can be evoked through displays of history. No other place is this more 
evident than in a nation’s museums, particularly those dedicated to displays of war 





Museums organise their displays in a way which creates meaning and evokes emotion 
(Lee, 2018). They are able to humanise the dead by displaying photographs, material 
objects, and first-hand accounts. This enables the visitor to adopt a certain: “point 
from which to view” the war (Edkins, 2003, p. 158). It is an emotional and educational 
experience which elicits viewing the war dead as ‘living’ (Edkins, 2003). Contemporary 
people are therefore connected to the war dead by the emotion elicited from the 
displays presented at museums (Ray, 2006). Museums dedicated to war history are 
thus sites where the living and the dead can exist together in an ‘imagined community’ 
enabling the site to foster a sense of nationhood within the visitor (Anderson & 
O'Gorman, 2016). This sense of national identity is transferred through the generations 
by the preservation of the museums and monuments which elicit those feelings 
(Bartelson, 2006). Subsequent generations then revise and update museum contents 
depending on their contemporary perspective therefore shaping and reshaping the 
collective memory it possesses (Halbwachs & Coser, 1992).   
 
 
 The Past and its Reconstruction 
 
The recollection of the past is fundamentally a socially constructed activity. When an 
individual thinks about the past, the images which come to mind are reshaped by their 
current concerns, needs, and perspectives within a group or society. Halbwachs and 
Coser (1992, p. 46) states that: “in reality the past does not recur as such […] everything 
seems to indicate that the past is not preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the 
present.”. This process is a mutual reconstruction between the individual and the 
group of which he or she is a member. The memories are thus drawn from the 
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individual’s perspective in being a part of the group which creates an amalgamation of 
the individual and the group memory (Corning & Schuman, 2015). This may also allow 
the individual to draw on memories and recollections of other members, or of key 
events and experiences which have become part of the oral or written history of the 
group (Corning & Schuman, 2015). The memories shared by individuals in a group 
form a collective memory which serves to maintain and preserve the existence of that 
group. In collective memory theory, a group can range from two individuals to a nation 
or a wider grouping of people (Halbwachs & Coser, 1992). The theory was taken further 
by one of Halbwachs’ major successors, Barry Schwartz. He surmised that: 
 
Collective memory refers to the distribution throughout society of 
what individuals believe, feel, and know about the past. […] 
individuals do not know the past singly; they know it with and against 
other individuals situated in different groups and through the 
knowledge and symbols that predecessors and contemporaries 
transmit to them. (Schwartz, 1991, p. 303) 
 
Through this, the process of recollection becomes vital in affirming the past and 
present character and identity of the group. This shows that an individual’s memory 
cannot be completely disassociated from, or devoid of, that of the group. Collective 
memory is therefore a collection of individual memories which are interdependent and 
continuously fluid. Schwartz furthers Halbwachs’ theory by arguing that: 
 
[…] our understandings of the past are projections of our own social 
experience. Defined as “reflections” or “reproductions” of present 
concerns, these understandings are assumed distorted and beyond the 
rememberer’s control. The past, then, is never autonomous and 
consequential. (Schwartz, 1991, p. 302) 
 
How the past is presented and represented at designated sites of memory, therefore, 
offers insight into the complexity of the collective memory of a group, society, and a 
nation. Analysis of these sites also indicates how contemporary circumstances shape 
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and reshape the representations of history within them and exposes the contested 





Collective memory is represented to individuals and groups through various mediums 
such as statues, memorials and museums. Lee (2018, p. 11) states that: “In sites of 
memory, past events are embodied through narratives and physical artefacts.”. 
Symbols are a way of eliciting and solidifying a certain collective memory from the 
viewer (Schwartz, 1991). Statues and memorials, in particular, provide an insight into 
how people at the time of their construction perceived and remembered events of 
national significance. The representations and symbols produced by a society closely 
link to both historical and current values and beliefs (Schwartz, 1991). Furthermore, the 
individual becomes vital to the creation and continuation of these collective memories 
which subsist through the physical symbols. As the number of direct witnesses to an 
historical event decreases over time, the dedicated sites to that event serve as windows 
of interpretation into the everchanging collective memory of the society (Forsberg, 
2003).  
 
Through analysis of what is presented at, and what is absent from these sites as well as 
amendments to them and their content, a greater understanding of national collective 
memory can be ascertained. What is memorialised, commemorated or omitted from 
these places is often the decision of national and local governments, private and public 
institutions, and local communities. Each of these groups draw on their individual 
members’ memories to present a history which is in keeping with the collective 
memory of the group (Halbwachs & Coser, 1992). Analysis of these particular historical 







The collective memory held by a family for the loss of a loved one in war is part of the 
larger collective memory of society which is commemorated and shared through 
memorials. This familial memory is essentially a collection of memories from numerous 
families in society who have had similar but different experiences of the death of a 
family member (Ray, 2006). The gathering of these memories into a specific site 
creates a place representative of the collective memory of the wider family of the 
nation. By eliciting the family in displays, viewers are able to easily relate to the 
suffering experienced by their compatriots during wartime (Edkins, 2003).  
 
Since the 1980s, there has been a worldwide increase in the construction of memorials 
and museums dedicated to peace and war, particularly in Japan which now houses one 
third of all peace museums globally (den Dungen, 2006). These sites serve different 
purposes depending on the collective memory which they represent. Art historian 
Arthur Danto (1985, p. 153) made a distinction between memorials and monuments 
stating that: “memorials are cathartic, healing sites which embrace remembrance, while 
monuments are triumphalist and represent a celebration of victory.” The memorials are, 
thus, places where the harrowing deaths of individuals are represented as heroic 
sacrifices deserving of national celebration (Edkins, 2003). A collective memory of the 
nation is channelled and expressed through these memorials. Monuments, however, are 
displays of success and triumph. In defeated countries, such as Japan, many monuments 





The father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, surmised that as part of the mourning 
process there is a natural progression of emotions (Freud, 1957). A transformation from 
negative emotions of a loved one’s tragic death to positive emotions is experienced by 
a grieving individual. When applied to national mourning in the case of war, the 
nation experiences trauma due to the premature deaths of large numbers of its people 
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(Hashimoto, 2015). This manifests into a memory of externalised violence. A war 
memorial is a place where this loss and grief can be overcome. Through them, the 
death is preserved, and the memory is physicalised. They serve to positively 
memorialise the tragic deaths suffered by the nation. The war dead thus become 
‘possessions of the nation’ and live on through its collective memory (Mayo, 1988). 
Emotional reconciliation is achieved by placing these memories in a permanent setting 
in which they can also become part of a social context (Hashimoto, 2015). The site of 
memorial therefore enables a society to reconcile the trauma of war death by 
memorialising the sacrifices of its people. A resulting sense of national pride and 
identity is thus affected.  
 
As war dead are ‘possessions of the nation’, the construction of memorials is often 
decided by national or local governmental bodies without much public consultation. 
This can lead to dissatisfaction among some war-bereaved families, however, as the 
memorialisation of their loved ones is conducted and implemented outside of their 
control (Anderson & O'Gorman, 1998). In Japan, disapproval has been expressed by 
some families who have had their loved ones enshrined at Yasukuni. To date, the site 
has enshrined nearly two and a half million war dead without any consent from the 
families of the deceased (Lee, 2018). This exposes some of the contestation around the 





The majority of studies on collective war memories have been conducted in reference 
to victorious countries (Hashimoto, 2015). The portrayal of war memories, however, is 
expressed differently in countries which have been defeated. Forgetting is also a 
significant factor to the development of collective memories of defeated countries, 
particularly in those which have committed atrocities (Forty & Küchler, 1999). A 
society’s strength as a collective lies in its shared pride and sacrifice in war (Stone & 
Hirst, 2014). When negative aspects of the country’s past actions are memorialised, a 
collective memory of shame and humiliation is created. This can often be a cathartic 
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process, as well as a show of contrition to the international community (Hashimoto, 
2015). A process of forgetting is often simultaneously experienced, however, through 
voluntary omission of historical bellicosity by the defeated country. This can result in 
tense relations with countries who were subjected to the violence and aggression. The 
victim country thus becomes acrimonious toward its former aggressor due to the 
perceived lack of remembrance for committed atrocities (Forty & Küchler, 1999). This 
process of forgetting can lead to the revision of historical narratives presented at war 
memorials and museums. Individuals in the defeated country often inadvertently 
accept this revised history and in some cases are taught it in schools. These revised 
histories frequently downplay or omit atrocities committed by the defeated country 
and instead celebrate and memorialise the sacrifice of the lives lost in the war 
(Inuzuka, 2013). The defeat, then, can lead to a sense of post-war victimhood for the 
subservience and occupation experienced at the behest of the victor states. This sense 
of victimhood has been an integral part in the development of Japan’s collective 
memory. 
 
In equitably analysing the collective memory of a nation, consideration must be given 
to the collective forgetting which societies produce. On an individual level, the ability 
to forget is needed to have a healthy and normal life (Stone & Hirst, 2014). On a 
societal level, forgetting, to various degrees, is necessary to maintain a sense of unity 
and identity (Gordon, 2015). This is particularly common when there are historical 
aspects which reflects badly on the society’s reputation and image, and in certain cases 
legitimacy. This process, however, differs for each country and can manifest in 
different ways. 
 
Collective Memories of Defeat 
 
In the case of Japan and Germany, two defeated Axis powers of World War Two, 
interesting figures demonstrate a marked level of forgetting among the population. 
Schuman and Corning (2012) conducted a survey in both countries with the majority of 
questions relating to the respondent’s memory and/or impression of the war 
experienced in their country. The results of the 1991 survey from both countries 
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showed that there was a large absence of answers referring to themes which were 
expected to have been prevalent.  
 
In the German results of the survey there was an assumption that the populace would 
feel guilt and shame for the persecution of the Jews during World War Two. The 
results showed, however, that only seven out of 728 participants mentioned Jews at any 
point in their responses, with all seven being individuals who were born after the War 
(Schuman & Corning, 2012). The responses from individuals who lived through the war 
period referred much more to memories involving personal hardship such as 
shortages, bombings, and occupation. These results showed a difficulty among the 
German population to possess memories which depict their own country as an 
aggressor and committer of atrocities. They rather had a tendency to hold memories 
similar to that of victims which invoke individual feelings of hardship and sacrifice 
(Forty & Küchler, 1999). 
 
The results for Japan, however, were rather contrasting. The mention of Hiroshima was 
only found in 20 out of 843 respondents despite the event of the atomic bombing being 
prominent in the memories of people around the world (Schuman & Corning, 2012). 
This is in contrast to the German example as the events in Hiroshima represent Japan 
as a victim rather than a victimizer (Buruma, 1994). It also suggests that the trauma of 
Hiroshima is remembered as a localised collective memory rather than that 
experienced by the whole population. 
 
The findings show that the lack of responses to traumatic events of Hiroshima and the 
Holocaust is similar to the results in victor countries. That is that individuals, and the 
public at large, are much more concerned with the personal impacts these events had 
on their lives and not the broader political or historical meaning. Academics and 
politicians, however, analyse the symbolic and political implications of these events 
more than the individuals who possess the collective memories of them (Middleton & 







For Japan, the remembrance of the war has been a contentious issue in international 
relations. The Japanese population is said to suffer ‘collective amnesia’ when it comes 
to their war time past (Stone & Hirst, 2014). While this collective forgetting can be 
interpreted as a response to Japan being characterized as an aggressor and victimizer, 
it also encompasses forgetting of the atomic bomb of Hiroshima, and Japan being the 
victim. Hiroshima holds a prominent place in the collective memory of many societies 
around the world and the city has become a place for the promotion of world peace. 
Despite this, the collective memory of Hiroshima among the Japanese remains 
contested. Yasukuni, equally holds a divisive position in Japan’s collective memory. 
The associated museums to the two sites analysed in this study are often presented as 
possessing competing narratives of the Asia-Pacific War. Analysis of these narratives, 
and the effects they have on the Japanese populous, however, suggests a level of 
complementarity in their effect on the nation’s collective war memory and Japanese 
identity. It reveals a more complex area of study than the over-simplistic perspective of 
historical revisionism equating to victim consciousness. The categorising of Japan’s 
collective memory as ‘collective amnesia’ is not as comprehensible as is commonly 
purported among Western scholars. In this study, analysis of symbols, museum 
content, visitor comments, and public discourse aims to produce a more balanced 
understanding of Japan’s selective remembering and forgetting and the effect this has 











Chapter 2: Yasukuni 
 
“Your noble spirit rests in the shrine of Yasukuni, my son. But why don’t you come visit 
your mother every now and then, at least in her dreams.” – Tribute to a Japanese solider 





This chapter analyses the role Yasukuni Shrine and the associated Yūshūkan Museum 
plays in Japan’s collective memory beginning with an outline of the sites’ history and 
development, the “Yasukuni Problem”, interpretation of its symbols, collective 
forgetting, and museum content and its effect on visitors. Throughout this chapter 
focus will be given to three main aspects of collective memory related to Yasukuni; 
national remembrance of war dead, the spirits of the war dead, and collective 
forgetting. This will contribute to an understanding of the sense of national identity 
and belonging among Japanese people and the divisive nature of Yasukuni in Japanese 
society. Emphasis of the relationship between the living and the dead presented at 
Yasukuni is integral to its collective memory and is inextricably linked to historical war 
narratives (Sakamoto, 2015). This has resulted in collective forgetting of certain aspects 
of the war among the population.  
 
 
A Site of National Trauma 
 
With the surrender of Japan in 1945, the Japanese population was faced with the shame 
of meeting a catastrophic defeat. The post-war society now possesses memories of a 
nation with a discredited and stigmatized past. The defeat of a country in war can have 
a profound effect on the trajectory of a nation’s consciousness and henceforth produce 
a ‘culture of defeat’ (Schivelbusch, 2003). In order to recover from this ‘national 
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trauma’, a defeated country produces war narratives to aid understanding of what 
happened (Takenaka, 2015). In doing so, its people are able to process the failures of 
the nation, mourn and memorialise the war dead, and apportion blame on those 
responsible for waging a war that was unwinnable. In the case of Japan, the post-war 
society has been heavily influenced by this national trauma which has resulted in 
schisms in historical narratives and put into question Japan’s war responsibility. This 
has shaped different collective memories about the war within Japanese society.  
 
The national trauma of the war is a vital part of Japanese collective memory and 
continues to be a discordant and contested subject, one which is used by conservative 
groups to promote historical revisionism and glorify militarism. Under the current Abe 
administration, a concerted effort has been made to expand Japan’s military ability by 
amending the pacifist clause of the Japanese Constitution (Osaki & Kikuchi, 2017). The 
national trauma of the war is often cited by those calling for the preservation of Article 
9 of the Japanese Constitution, however nationalists and conservatives in the society 
directly challenge this ‘pacifist’ narrative (Basu, 2016). The current governments’ 
sympathy with nationalist groups, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s familial conservatism, 
and the sense that Japan has expressed sufficient contrition for wartime aggression, 
have produced a collective memory which identifies strongly with a sense of national 
pride and ‘Japaneseness’ (Takenaka, 2015). This is manifested through the narrative 
that Yasukuni represents which utilises the concept of death by producing a sense of 





Yasukuni Shrine is located in central Tokyo’s Chiyoda Ward, a few hundred metres 
from the grounds of the Imperial Palace (Yasukuni Jinja, 2018d). The site was 
established in 1869 to honour the spirits of those who died during the Boshin Sensō 
(Japanese Civil War), fighting for Emperor Meiji (reign 1867-1912) against the 
Tokugawa Shogunate government (Kublin, 1949; Takenaka, 2015). A literal translation 
of the name, Yasukuni, is ‘pacifying the nation’, and the shrine states that it was 
 16 
intended to: “bring peace to the homeland […] build a peaceful nation” (Yasukuni Jinja, 
2018a). This foundation of Yasukuni also reflects the restoration of the Imperial powers 
in Japan in 1868. The emperor was re-established as the head of state and called for 
Shinto to be the state religion. This was modelled on the European tradition of having 
a national religion with the sovereign as its head (McArthur, 2011). Thus, Yasukuni, 
became the central religious site for national commemoration of military service 
deaths. Presently, the shrine holds period commemoration ceremonies on specific 
state anniversaries, such as the end of World War Two, as well as occasions in line with 
Shinto practices. These events are manifestations of the collective memory which 
Yasukuni purports and recreate the memories of the dead. 
 
Yasukuni has 2,466,000 souls enshrined within it, all of which have fought in wars for 
Japan up until 1945 (McArthur, 2011). While the remains of the dead are not housed at 
the site, their spirits are said to reside within it. The enshrinement of the deceased is 
decided by the priests of Yasukuni. The process is complete after a ceremony involving 
the writing of the deceased’s names on wooden boards and the placing of them in the 
Reijibo Hoanden (Repository for the Symbolic Registry of Deities) (Yasukuni Jinja, 
2018d). The enshrined henceforth become deities and are regarded as possessions of 
the nation (Higurashi, 2013). This process, however, has created consternation from 
some bereaved families who disapprove of their loved ones being commemorated in 
this way (Takenaka, 2015). These ‘souls’ are an important aspect in the shaping of 





In 1947, Yasukuni became a private religious institution with the enactment of the 
Japanese Constitution and its Article 20 which separates religion and state (Prime 
Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 1947). Many war-bereaved military families felt the 
new constitution had led to the deaths of their loved ones enshrined at Yasukuni no 
longer being officially recognised by the state (Takenaka, 2015). The Izokukai (Bereaved 
Families of the War Dead) was thus created and became instrumental in the 
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development of Yasukuni’s relationship with the state and the aspect of the family in 
collective war memory (Takenaka, 2015). A number of these families have connections 
to political elites within the government and often used as justification for state 
support of Yasukuni (Higurashi, 2013). The collective memory of these families has 
become an integral aspect of shaping public debate around the war (Schwartz, 1991).  
 
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has been the ruling party for most of the 
years since 1955, championed the cause of the Izokukai in the post-war decades 
(Takenaka, 2015). The LDP in association with the Izokukai, introduced five bills 
during the 1960s and 1970s calling for the restoration of state-sanctioned support for 
Yasukuni. These attempts all failed to pass in the Diet, however they demonstrated the 
commitment of the LDP to the cause of the Izokukai in striving for state recognition of 
the deceased (Higurashi, 2013). This created public debate of the place that Yasukuni 




The “Yasukuni Problem” 
 
From 1946 to 1948, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo 
Tribunal) was convened to try military and political leaders of the Empire of Japan for 
suspected war crimes (Takenaka, 2015). The crimes committed by the criminals were 
designated into three categories: Class A – crimes against peace, Class B – conventional 
war crimes, Class C – crimes against humanity (Lukner, 2015). At the end of the 
tribunal, some 1,618 individuals were convicted of war crimes including fourteen 
verdicts of Class A designation (Lukner, 2015). In 1954, the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare set up a system to work with Yasukuni by providing information regarding 
details of deceased war veterans which the institution enshrined periodically in 
subsequent years (Higurashi, 2013). The following decade, in 1966, the Ministry 
provided information to the shrine of the fourteen convicted Class A war criminals, all 
of which had received the death penalty at the Tokyo Tribunal including the wartime 
prime minister Hideki Tojo (Higurashi, 2013). This demonstrates the intention of the 
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government to shape Japan’s collective war memory by exonerating the convicted 
wartime leadership through the deification process at Yasukuni.  
 
The head priest Tsukuba Fujimaru, resisted enshrinement of the convicted individuals 
despite the shrine passing a resolution to do so (Takenaka, 2015). After Fujimaru’s 
death in 1978, the new head priest Nagayoshi Matsudaira enshrined the fourteen Class 
A criminals in a unpublicised, clandestine ceremony (Higurashi, 2013). Matsudaira had 
long rejected the validity of the Tokyo Tribunal and its verdicts. The enshrinement of 
the war criminals was revealed the following year and exposed state advocacy for 
military nationalism through the vehicle of Yasukuni (Lee, 2018). 
 
The contested nature of Yasukuni in collective memory was most clearly evident when 
the site received Imperial disapproval. Wartime Emperor Hirohito (reign, 1926-1989) 
refused to ever visit the shrine again upon learning of the war criminals’ enshrinement 
in 1979 (South China Morning Post, 2018). Nevertheless, commemorating of the 
enshrined is still cited by conservative politicians today as justification for state 
support of Yasukuni (South China Morning Post, 2016). This demonstrates the  
Figure 1 - Yasukuni Shrine Precinct. Image downloaded from https://earth.google.com/web in December 2018 
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interconnectedness of Yasukuni and the government in shaping a national collective 
memory of the war by employing remembrance of the ‘souls’ of the deceased. 
 
2.2 Mnemonic Devices 
 
Statues and memorials within the Yasukuni precinct (see figure 1) perform important 
mnemonic1 functions in collective memory. Through semiotics2, a better 
understanding of the meanings behind them can be established. This allows 
interpretation of the collective memory which Yasukuni elicits, and the function 
statues and memorials play within it. Their relevance to collective memory can be 
defined by Schwartz (1991) who stated that: 
 
 
statues provided ways of thinking about assimilation […], ways of 
reading different aspects of […] life. Like other commemorative 
devices, they were less instrumental, in the sense of producing 
practical effects, than semiotic, in the sense of formulating meaning. 
 
 
The formulation of meaning through ‘commemorative devices’ is thus indicative of a 
culture’s interpretation of the past. By supposing this theory on Yasukuni, 
understanding of the historical and contemporary function of statues and memorials 
within the site can be established to provide more insight into its collective memory.  
 
 
                                               
1 Aiding or designed to aid the memory. Relating to the power of memory 
(https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mnemonic) 
2 The study of signs and symbols and their use or interpretation 
(https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/semiotics) 
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Statue to Masujirō Ōmura 
 
 
At the entrance of Yasukuni Shrine stands a statue the founder of Japan’s modern 
Imperial Army, Masujirō Ōmura (1824-1869), shown in figures 2 and 3 (Augustyn et al., 
2018). The statue stands as the tallest in the whole Yasukuni precinct and was erected 
in 1893 as the first Western-style bronze statue in Japan (Yasukuni Jinja, 2018d). During 
his lifetime, Ōmura was instrumental in bringing an end to the feudal system and 
Japan’s self-imposed isolation. This gained him notability as a precocious strategist and 
after the reestablishment of Imperial rule with the Meiji Restoration in 1868, he was 
made minister of military affairs (Kublin, 1949). 
 
In 1869, however, Ōmura was assassinated by a group of remaining samurai while 
visiting military schools in Kyoto (Augustyn et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the foundation 
he laid for the establishment of the Imperial Army was not forgotten and the bronze 
statue erected to him now sits in the main promenade leading to the entrance of 
Yasukuni Shrine. 
 
At the time of its erection in 1893, 24 years after the death of Ōmura, Japan was 
experiencing one of the most rapid modernisations of any country in history (Augustyn 
Figure 2 - Statue of Masujirō Ōmura downloaded 
 from www.muza-chan.net in December 2018 
Figure 3 - Entrance to Yasukuni Shrine with Statue of Masujirō 
Ōmura in background. Taken by the author in July 2016 
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et al., 2018). By erecting the statue of the Imperial Military’s founder, this 
demonstrated to the population the importance of the army to Japan, its society, 
modernisation, and Yasukuni (Kublin, 1949). The statue was cast in bronze and in a 
Western style and was reflective of Japan’s desire to match the West, however depicts 
Ōmura in a traditional hakama (male kimono) with a samurai sword; a connection to 
Japan’s traditional values. These values include bravery until the last, total loyalty to 
the emperor, and honourable death as the highest service to the nation (Takenaka, 
2015). The irony is that Ōmura was said to have taken offence to the continued 
donning of samurai clothing by his peers after the Meiji Restoration (Augustyn et al., 
2018). This shows the manipulation of memory by the designers of the statue 
(Schwartz, 1991).  
 
The statue of Ōmura has enabled Yasukuni to distinguish him as a significant figure 
“infusing the past with moral meaning” (Schwartz, 1991, p. 302). It relates to an image 
of the past that is one in which the Imperial Army was crucial to Japan and its people. 
It elicits a collective memory within the visitor of a venerable and respectable military. 
These values are also frequently referred to in displays within the Yūshūkan Museum. 
The statue stands as a tribute not only to Ōmura, but the Imperial Army. An army 
which was responsible for atrocities and war crimes committed in Korea, China, 
Greater East Asia, and the Pacific.  
 
 
Memorial Monument to Radhabinod Pal 
 
Yasukuni has become renowned for its manufacturing of historical narratives in order 
to inspire patriotism. This produces collective forgetting and validates the re-
examining of historical facts. The manipulation of memory is evident in memorials 







In the grounds of Yasukuni is a memorial to Justice Radhabinod Pal of India (1886 – 
1967), shown in figure 4 (Yasukuni Jinja, 2018d). Pal was the sole Indian judge on the 
panel of eleven judges appointed by the United Nations to the Tokyo Tribunal. The 
memorial was erected in 2005 and displays a photograph of the judge in his court dress 
on a stone background (Yasukuni Jinja, 2018d). Engraved in the stone is a translation of 
one of Pal’s quotes:  
 
When time shall have softened passion and prejudice, when Reason 
shall have stripped the mask from misrepresentation, then Justice, 
holding evenly her scales, will require much of past censure and praise 
to change places. (Yasukuni Jinja, 2018d).  
 
There is a place holder for flowers, and also a case containing free papers explaining, in 
both English and Japanese, the significance of Pal to the Japanese people. A similar 
monument to Pal was erected after his death in Kyoto’s Ryozen Gokoku Shrine 
(Nakajima, 2011). Pal is remembered for his issuing of a dissentient assessment at the 
conclusion of the Tokyo Tribunal.  
Figure 4 - Monument to Dr. Pal. Image downloaded from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ jpg in December 2018 
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The Dissentient Judgment of Justice Pal stated that there was no legal basis for the 
prosecution of all Class A defendants, as well as a significant number of Class B and 
Class C defendants (Nakajima, 2011). In Pal’s eyes, the constitution of the tribunal was 
flawed as it allowed for the charges of crimes which were not specified under 
international law at the time they were committed. He argued that these crimes could 
not be cited retrospectively. Conservative groups laud Pal as a defender of the Japanese 
people. Due to his not being Japanese, the exoneration of Pal provides these groups 
with a sense of international validation for their assertions. Yasukuni states that: 
“Among all the judges of the tribunal, he was the only one who submitted judgment 
which insisted all defendants were not guilty” (Yasukuni Jinja, 2018d). 
 
 
Misappropriation of Pal 
 
Since the tribunal, Pal has become a symbol of validation for the historical revisionism 
appropriated at Yasukuni, despite Article 11 of the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco stating 
that: “Japan accepts the judgements of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East” (United Nations, 1951, p. 56). Pal’s image has been used to reshape collective 
memory of the war. His judgements, however, have been largely misappropriated. His 
dissentient judgment asserted that under a different structure with the appropriate 
legal parameters for a fair and just trial, the accused would still have been convicted as 
the evidence of their ‘devilish’ acts was indisputable (Nakajima, 2011).  
 
Historical revisionists and many members of the political elite, including Prime 
Minister Abe, however, exonerate Justice Pal. They ignore the claims of undeniable 
evidence of atrocities and war crimes referred to in his 1,235-page report (Nakajima, 
2011). This interpretation of the judgement demonstrates the shaping of a collective 
memory that absolves Japan of any war responsibility by selectively choosing which 




As Danto (1985, p. 153) states: “…monuments are triumphalist and represent a 
celebration of victory.” In this definition, the Monument to Dr. Pal at Yasukuni can be 
viewed as a victory for the misappropriation of Pal to justify the validation of reshaping 
collective memory and historical inaccuracies. The erection of the memorial is not only 
dedicated to an outspoken judge, it is a ‘monument’ to a shaped collective memory. 
One that forgets aspects of Japan’s wartime history of aggression and associated crimes 
and validates the valour and bravery of the soldiers and people who sacrificed their 
lives for the country. It also shows how memory is co-opted to aid a sense of national 
identity and pride in being Japanese through Pal’s supposed ‘defence of the Japanese 
people’ (Yasukuni Jinja, 2018d). This collective memory has been openly supported by 
the state and allows for further validation of historical revision (Birdwhistell, 2017). In 
the process, it overlooks and elides the “disagreeable” elements of Japan’s history. 
 
 
2.3 Collective Forgetting 
 
The collective forgetting that is produced by Yasukuni Shrine is reflected among the 
historical knowledge of many young Japanese. In interviews conducted by the Japan 
Times (2017), young people were said to: “[seldom discuss] the historical significance of 
Aug. 15 (anniversary of the surrender of Japan) or the political tensions surrounding 
[Yasukuni] shrine.” (Miura, 2017). A survey conducted by NHK of 18- and 19-year-olds 
showed that 14% did not know the significance of August 15 despite it being an 
extremely historically significant day in the nation’s history (Takahashi & Aramaki, 
2016). Professor Tsuyoshi Fujii of Meiji University analysed these results stating that: 
“the figures could reflect how some history courses in middle and high schools do not 
cover the war.”(Miura, 2017). A 19-year-old university student of Tokyo stated that the 
history of the war which he was taught at school: 
 
[…] traced over the period without delving too deeply into detail. 
Japan’s role in the war, or its consequences, rarely come up in 
conversations among friends. And my parents were born after the war, 
so the topic doesn’t really come up at home as well. (Miura, 2017) 
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This suggests a collective forgetting not only among young people, but their parents’ 
generation as well. The way in which history is taught in schools, and its impact on 
subsequent generations, is a salient aspect in understanding the effectiveness of the 





Public schools across Japan are provided with a list of history textbooks from which to 
teach which is compiled by the Ministry of Education (Inuzuka, 2013). In many of these 
history textbooks, details of the atrocities committed by the Japanese in Asia, such as 
germ warfare and biological weapons experimentation on Chinese civilians, is largely 
omitted. This produces collective forgetting among the students who use them which 
uniformly affects the collective memory of Japanese society (McCurry, 2018; Weng, 
1998; Yamane, 1998).  
 
In 1997, Professor Emeritus of the Tokyo University of Education, Saburō Iyenaga, won 
a 32-year-long case to have Japan’s germ warfare and the Nanking Massacre written 
into Japanese history textbooks (Yamane, 1998). The Nanking Massacre of 1937 was an 
offensive on the city of Nanking, the Chinese capital at the time. Estimates of the 
number of Chinese killed, the majority of whom were civilians, range from 40,000 to 
300,000 (Weng, 1998). The Tokyo Tribunal concluded that the death toll in the 
incident numbered over 200,000 with the number of rapes at 20,000 (Nakajima, 2011). 
The ruling forced the Ministry of Education to include this history as well as the 
existence of Unit 731, a biological weapons test facility run by the Japanese in China, 
and the forced prostitution of women by the Imperial Army (McCurry, 2018; Yamane, 
1998).  
 
While this was a success for the teaching of an accurate history, no requirements as to 
the level of detail to be provided were given, thus, many textbooks subsequently only 
included brief details of the atrocities. More focus is given, therefore, to the atomic 
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bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the associated sense of victimhood. In the 
process, a collective forgetting of Japan’s history of transgression results (Yamane, 
1998). The collective memory of conservative political figures purports this forgetting 
by supporting the narrative presented at Yasukuni Shrine and its Yūshūkan museum.   
 
 
Abe and Grandfather Kishi 
 
Current prime minister Shinzo Abe’s support of Yasukuni has been largely influenced 
by the collective memory of his family. He has stated that much of his conservatism 
comes from his grandfather and former prime minister Nobusuke Kishi (in office, 1957-
1960)(Driscoll, 2010). This memory, however, has produced forgetting of Kishi’s war 
criminal history. 
 
Kishi was an influential figure in the government of the Japanese puppet state of 
Manchukuo (present-day Manchuria) which existed from 1932 to 1945. He viewed the 
34 million Chinese in Manchukuo as a resource to be exploited for the good of Japan 
(Driscoll, 2010). Kishi’s harsh and brutal treatment of the local people and forced 
enslavement earned him the title ‘the Showa-era monster’ (Kapur, 2011). In 1940, Kishi 
became munitions minister in Tojo Hideki’s cabinet. During the Asia-Pacific War, 
Kishi was responsible for the forced labour of some 670,000 Koreans and 40,000 
Chinese, the survivors of which were few (Driscoll, 2010). After the war, he was charged 
with Class A war crimes and held in prison for three years before being released 
(Kapur, 2011).  
 
As a strong critic of the judgments of the Tokyo Tribunal, Kishi often used Justice Pal’s 
dissent to legitimize his assertions of the verdicts’ invalidity (Nakajima, 2011). Abe’s 
citing of Kishi in influencing his conservatism could reflect his support of the historical 
narrative represented through Yasukuni. The production of collective forgetting of war 
crimes thus exonerates the image of his grandfather and could explain his affinity with 
Yasukuni. This may not only be an association of a purely political nature, but a deeply 
personal one as well. The familial memory of Abe is therefore affected by the present 
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controversy surrounding Yasukuni (Halbwachs & Coser, 1992). Criticism of the 
narrative of Yasukuni could strengthen his resolve in affirming support of the 





Abe and 80 per cent of his cabinet are members of Nippon Kaigi (The Japan 
Conference) (Sugano, 2016). The Prime Minister himself and Deputy Prime Minister 
Taro Aso serve as special supreme advisors to Nippon Kaigi which is often portrayed in 
the media as a group adhering to traditional Japanese values through the observance of 
Shinto rituals (Kim, 2014). Nippon Kaigi, however, consists of a diverse collection of 
conservative political figures and lawmakers, academics, business people, lobbyists, 
and religious groups. These groups all share nationalist sentiments encompassed by 
Nippon Kaigi’s five principles, two of which relate to the shaping of collective memory: 
‘Patriotic education’ and ‘Correcting historical narratives’ (Sugano, 2016). These are 
both achieved through various means such as supporting the revision of history 
textbooks and modifying museum content. They largely draw on the concepts of ‘dead 
among the living’ and stress the importance of remembering the souls of the deceased. 
In doing so, they elicit collective forgetting of the more unsavoury aspects of Japan’s 
wartime history (Sugano, 2016). Barry Schwartz (1991, p. 306) stated that:  
 
Images of the past bear the imprint of the present not because of an 
impersonal affinity between them but because of the actions of people 
who feel deeply about both, and in some measure successfully impose 
their convictions upon contemporaries. 
 
The Prime Minister and his Cabinet’s large representation within Nippon Kaigi, 
therefore, demonstrates a desire to shape the collective memory of the war for the 
national interest. Yasukuni represents this state-sanctioned, ‘ideal’ collective memory 
and receives government approval and support for it (Birdwhistell, 2017). It serves as a 





“We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to our allied nations of East Asia, who 
have consistently cooperated with the Empire toward the emancipation of East Asia.” – 
Emperor Hirohito, August 14, 1945.  
 
Located next to Yasukuni Shrine is the associated Yūshūkan military museum. This 
institution presents, in detail and depth, all of the collective memory for which 
Yasukuni stands. The narrative of the museum glorifies the Imperial Japanese army’s 
expansionism during the Asia-Pacific War and portrays Japan as a liberator of Asian 
peoples from Western colonialism. This history does not refer to the Imperial Army’s 
acts of aggression into Asia as ‘invasions’, but rather as ‘advances’ (Yamane, 2017). It 
also displays no evidence of the victimisation inflicted on the people of the Asia-Pacific 
region (McArthur, 2011). This produces a collective forgetting among the visitors to the 
museum and draws on the concept of ‘dead among the living’ to create a collective 
memory which imbues a sense of national pride (Sakamoto, 2015). This revisionist 
narrative is affirmed by the various conservative nationalist groups such as Nippon 
Kaigi, as well as political elites including Prime Minister Abe and members of his 
Cabinet.  
 
Analysis of the content of the museum allows interpretation of the collective memory 
it aims to elicit. The use of ‘somatic markers’ is employed in the museum to produce an 
affinity with the dead among the visitors (Damasio et al., 1996). The term ‘somatic’ 
refers to something relating to the body rather than the mind. The effect of somatic 
markers is experienced at a preconscious level. In this essence, an idea, object, or 
symbol is sufficiently repeated in order to induce an effective response (Damasio et al., 
1996). As Sakamoto (2015, p. 174) states: “[this produces] condensed meaning and 
feeling”. In the Yūshūkan, repeated themes of death produce a sense of connection of 
the living to the deceased (Sakamoto, 2015). This enables susceptible reception of the 






At Yasukuni, the lives of the war dead are seen as martyrs to the nation. This sense of 
martyrdom allows their deaths meaning and contributes to a sense of national 
belonging. The Yūshūkan states that: “the displays help us understand the spiritual 
connections of the enshrined with their bereaved families” (Yasukuni Jinja, 2018b). The 
concept of the eirei (spirits of war dead) is essential to understanding this connection. 
In the Yūshūkan, the narratives around the eirei are presented in an evocative and 
heroic way in order to create a sense of national belonging and pride (Sakamoto, 2015). 
The museum clearly explains this on its website through the following statement:  
 
Looking at the artefacts and documents displayed in the Yūshūkan 
allows us to appreciate the joy of life to live as Japanese, the 
preciousness of life, and the importance of peace. (Yasukuni Jinja, 
2018b).  
 
This demonstrates that the purpose and intent of the displays is to create patriotism 
and a sense of national identity and pride with visitors.  
 
The Yūshūkan offers redemption to the war dead by presenting their sacrifice as a 
contributing factor to the prosperity of Japan. This narrative around the eirei can be 
seen in the display of the story of the Japanese battleship Yamato, the largest 
battleship ever built. As the ship was being bombarded by American bombers and its 
sinking was imminent, the captain stated: “If Japan does not come to its senses now, 
when will it be saved? We will lead the way. We will die as harbingers of Japan’s new 
life. That’s where our real satisfaction lies.” (Hashimoto, 2015, p. 20). The death of the 
ship’s crew is thus not in vain, despite the defeat of Japan. Their death is a sacrifice 
given to the nation in order that it rebuilds anew (Sakamoto, 2015). This appreciation 
to the eirei for the prosperity Japan enjoys today is evident among visitors to the 






Death permeates the large amount of the Yūshūkan exhibits. No more is this apparent 
than in the displays of kamikaze fighters. The kamikaze, literally ‘divine wind’, were 
male soldiers, some as young as 18, sent on suicide missions against American ships 
during the Asia-Pacific War (Takenaka, 2015). Many Western historians cite the 
irrationality and desperation of the Japanese military as motivation for the deployment 
of kamikaze. Conversely, they are viewed as being akin to contemporary suicide 
bombers by psychologists and a result of exceptional state coercion (Sakamoto, 2015).  
 
At the Yūshūkan, however, the Kamikaze are portrayed as the ultimate expression of 
self-sacrifice for the country and this theme is the overriding aspect of their 
exhibitions. Photographs of the hundreds of determined-looking pilots are displayed 
all around and are coupled with letters to and from families, final wills, and bride dolls 
given by mothers to unwed soldiers (Sakamoto, 2015). A selection of the last messages 
from the soldiers are displayed monthly at the front of Yasukuni Shrine in order to: 
“share the thoughts of the noble souls who gave up their lives for the country they 
loved” (Yasukuni Jinja, 2018c). In this way, kamikaze are portrayed as tragic heroes of 
the nation propagating their deaths as sacrifices for the current prosperity of Japan. 
They have become an extremely emotive aspect of the Yūshūkan’s objective to elicit a 
collective memory imbued by death and grief. The kamikaze are essential to the 
‘imagined community’ which links the living with the dead (Anderson & O'Gorman, 
2016).  
 
Through the employment of the kamikaze and deceased soldiers as somatic markers, a 
connection between the public memory and individually experienced emotions is 
established (Connolly, 2002). This demonstrates why the Yūshūkan and Yasukuni have 
remained popular places in Japan despite the revised history and controversy 
surrounding them. The use of somatic markers to shape collective memories among 
the population can help to explain the continued regard of Yūshūkan as an historical 




2.5 Visitor Comments 
 
The appeal of the Yūshūkan can be seen in its selection of comments written in its 
visitors’ book which are published on the museum’s website. The space for writing 
comments comes at the conclusion of all of the exhibitions. It is a spacious room lined 
with pictures of the soldiers, “almost as if they are watching the writers of the 
comments” (Sakamoto, 2015, p. 172). As all of the displays evoke a feeling of the dead 
walking alongside the living in this ‘imagined community’, the environment in which 
the visitors write their comments is permeated by somatic markers (Anderson & 
O'Gorman, 2016). This ‘condensed sense of feeling’ is also aided by played recordings of 
previous visitors’ comments creating an example for people to follow (Sakamoto, 2015). 
There are five visitors’ books for people to sign giving ample time for the writers to 
think of what to write, and also view comments by previous visitors for inspiration 
(Sakamoto, 2015).  
 
The selected comments published on the Yūshūkan website commonly express a sense 
of pride in being Japanese. This is especially apparent among young visitors to the 
museum. Frequently used words such as ‘pride’, ‘sacrifice’, ‘honour’ indicate the 
effectiveness of somatic markers used throughout the exhibitions. An overwhelming 
usage of the word ‘gratitude’ has also been seen among the comments from the visitors 
(Sakamoto, 2015). The emotive portrayals of the kamikaze, displays of letters sent to 
and from the front, as well as personal photographs and possessions create an 
overriding theme of death which elicits emotional responses. The image of the 
kamikaze is used to especially appeal to people’s emotions and affect sympathetic 
sentiment (Sakamoto, 2015).  
 
These emotions, however, enable collective feelings to be imbued. Ahmed (2001, p. 
345) states that: “[emotions] align individuals with collectives [...] through the very 
intensity of their attachments.”. This alignment of individual’s emotions with the 
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collective memory of Japan’s war, or rather Japan’s sacrifice, is evident in the emotive 





Below are translations by the author of a number of poignant comments which 
demonstrate this connection of the visitors to collective memory. While the visitors’ 
book is not a true representation of all feelings experienced by each visitor, it gives an 
insight into the types of emotions that are felt. By selecting a sample of these 
comments from each year and publishing them on their website, the Yūshūkan is able 
to manufacture a certain collective memory to people who may not have yet visited. 
Many of the comments refer to people wishing they had visited earlier, or their desire 
to come back and tell their friends and family to visit. This promotes the ‘collective 
feeling’ of Yūshūkan, one which relates to Japanese identity, pride in one’s nation, and 
a shared feeling of being ‘Japanese’ with common values and history (Sakamoto, 2015) 
It also evokes gratitude for being born in a peaceful time due to the sacrifices of the 
eirei. Visitors to Yūshūkan often write of their pride in the nation of Japan and their 
gladness of having Japanese identity. The comments below from the Yasukuni Jinja 
(2017) website demonstrate the eliciting of a collective memory in which the ‘dead are 
among the living’. This common technique is used to shape collective memories in 
museums and is apparent in the following visitor remark: 
 
I often use the phrase “die!” when I’m joking around with my friends. 
After coming to Yasukuni, however, I was able to understand the real 
meaning of death from the people for which this place is dedicated. 
They surely experienced misery and chagrin. I will make the most of 
the life I have now thanks to those who fell protecting Japan. Thank 
you so much.  
 




Thank you for building up our nation of Japan. I am so glad I was born 
in this country of Japan. – Female, 24. 
 
I now know that those who fought and died in the Asia-Pacific war, in 
order to protect Japan, were us Japanese. That is why we now live in a 
peaceful country. I will live every day in gratitude. - Male, junior high 
school student.  
 
Thank you for fighting for Japan. – Male, 14 
 
It is apparent by the age of the writers that the Yūshūkan is frequented by youth, and 
even school children, to effective appeal.  
 
 
Targeting the Youth 
 
In researching these comments, a targeting of younger visitorship was observed. This is 
evident in the choice of visitor comments published on the website. Of the thirty-six 
comments by visitors who specified their age, twenty-six were under the age of forty, 
with the youngest being eleven-years-old (Yasukuni Jinja, 2017). Furthermore, the 
Yūshūkan website’s three-minute video explaining the artefacts, displays and purpose 
of the museum also documents the comments of three visitors under the age of forty 
(Yasukuni Jinja, 2018b). Their comments all express gratitude to the eirei for the peace 
Japan enjoys today. As younger people are further removed in time and space from the 
war, they are more likely to hold malleable memories of it. The Yūshūkan’s selectivity 
of comments thus demonstrates an attempt to shape collective memory of the war.  
 
Yūshūkan has been making efforts to attract more adherents to its revisionist 
narrative. The establishment of the Yūshūkan tomo no kai (Friends of the Yūshūkan 
Association) is one way the museum promotes visitorship, with particular incentives 
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for young people. For a yearly fee of 1,000 yen3 members who are under 25 years of age 
receive museum admission including opportunities to: “attend symposia, study groups 
and nature camps geared to themes associated with Yasukuni” (Takenaka, 2015, p. 181) 
The educating of the younger generation through emotional effect is thus a crucial 
aspect of Yasukuni’s shaping of collective memory (Lee, 2018). The transmitting of this 
revised history to subsequent generations therefore prevents any resolution to national 
contestation around war memory (Lee, 2018). While the perceived intention of these 
efforts is to inspire nationalism, a 2015 Gallup survey showed that the Japanese are the 
least patriotic people in the world, and the least likely to take up arms for their country 
(Hachima, 2015). This indicates that despite Yasukuni’s prompting of national pride 
among visitors, a sense of nonviolence and pacifism is the overriding notion behind a 





Yasukuni has allowed the history of war to be inextricably linked to a sense of national 
pride and belonging through the use of symbols, collective forgetting, and the 
Yūshūkan’s content and educational efforts. The collective memory this produces 
centres around the souls of the war dead who are at the very heart of Yasukuni and 
‘enshrine’ the institution itself in the national psyche. What is evident, however, is the 
manipulation of war discourse to further nationalistic objectives. The eirei are utilised 
to evoke sympathy and sorrow in visitors and produce a sense of Japanese identity 
made possible by depictions of their sacrifices to the nation. This associated historical 
revisionism and reshaping of collective memory receives government validation and 
support. Yasukuni’s place in Japanese society, therefore, will likely continue to be 
prominent notwithstanding contested. 
 
 
                                               




Chapter 3: Abe’s Visit 
 
“The peace and prosperity Japan enjoys today is not created only 
by those who are living.” - Shinzo Abe 
 
3.1 The Visit 
 
Political recognition of Yasukuni Shrine has exacerbated much of the “Yasukuni 
Problem” in public debate within Japan and overseas. The issue has been most 
prevalent during visits of Prime Ministers to Yasukuni. This chapter outlines the 
background of previous visits, public debate around the time of Prime Minister Abe’s 
2013 visit and how it shaped collective memory, the stated justification for visiting, and 





In 1985, the first visit by a standing Japanese prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, was 
made to Yasukuni on the fortieth anniversary of the surrender of Japan in the Asia-
Pacific War (Takenaka, 2015). The visit saw Nakasone sign the guest register with his 
official title of Prime Minister before confirming that his visit was made in an official 
capacity (Ravitch, 2014). It was also revealed that the offering given to the shrine by 
Nakasone was paid for by public money. This brought strong scrutiny from the public 
and also made headlines overseas (Ravitch, 2014). The story was run with the 
additional information about the secret enshrinement of the fourteen Class-A war 
criminals in 1979. Following this, Nakasone distanced himself from the shrine largely 
due to the strong criticism he had received internationally (Takenaka, 2015).  
 
The Yasukuni Problem was brought back into the public eye in the 2000s when LDP 
Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi made annual visits to Yasukuni in fulfilment of a 
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campaign promise (Ravitch, 2014). In response to public criticism, Koizumi stated that 
he ‘could not understand at all the sentiments of people who were against his 
worshiping of Japan’s war dead at Yasukuni’ (Li, 2014). His comments drew criticism 
from East Asian countries and significantly strained Japan’s international relations 
(Ravitch, 2014). This further exacerbated public debate about Yasukuni, not only for 
the Prime Minister’s official visits, but also the history the site teaches, the war 
criminals it enshrines, and the question of family permission for enshrinement. 
Furthermore, it leads to bigger questions about how Yasukuni affects national identity 
within society. The public response demonstrated the contested nature of Japan’s 
collective war memory and the place Yasukuni holds within it.  
 
Current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has also visited Yasukuni during his political career 
in several different roles. His most recent and controversial visit was in 2013 as the first 
sitting Prime Minister since Koizumi to do so (Mainichi Shimbun, 2013). He has since 
abstained from visiting while many of his cabinet members still visit in official 
capacities (South China Morning Post, 2016). Abe instead sends offerings to Yasukuni 
every year using his own private funds (Kim, 2014). This indicates an acceptance of the 
historical revisionist narrative presented at the Yasukuni site by Japan’s head of state 
and his government. In turn, right-wing nationalist groups feel vindicated in their 
assertions of historical inaccuracies. These groups, such as Nippon Kaigi, fervently 
campaign for historical revisionism and constitutional amendment with government 




In December 2012, Shinzo Abe was elected Prime Minister of Japan for the second time 
in his political career; the first being 2006-2007. The following year on December 26, 
exactly one year since he took office, he paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine (ANN News, 
2013). The reaction to the visit demonstrated contestation between the differing 
collective memories surrounding Yasukuni within Japanese society. Data from four of 
Japan’s most widely-read news agencies, Asahi, Yahoo, TBS, Kyodo and NHK indicated 
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a plurality of opinions about a prime ministerial visit to Yasukuni which subsequently 
affected, in part, the decision to refrain from making further visits (Nifutii News, 2017).  
 
Prior to the visit, Asahi News had conducted a timely survey of 5,500 people between 
November 6 and December 20 about their thoughts on a Prime Ministerial visit to 
Yasukuni, as well as further questions regarding Japan’s history. The results to the 
question, “Are you for a visit by the Prime Minister to Yasukuni Shrine?” showed that 
approximately 60 per cent of respondents were in favour, with a slightly higher margin 
for respondents in their twenties. In contrast, 22 per cent of respondents aged thirty or 
older, and only 15 percent among respondents in their twenties, were against a visit. 
(Kimura, 2013). In the same survey, participants were asked to respond to the question, 
“Do you think the Asia-Pacific War was a war of invasion, or not a war of invasion?”. 
The results showed that 55 per cent of respondents aged thirty or older agreed that the 
war was one of invasion, with a lesser amount of 45 per cent of respondents in their 
twenties concurring. Conversely, of respondents who disagreed, 33 per cent were in 
their twenties, with a lesser margin of 26 per cent thirty or older (Kimura, 2013).  
 
Due to this being an isolated survey, a trend cannot be observed, however the results 
indicate that young people are less likely to be against a visit by the Prime Minister to 
Yasukuni and that a majority are in favour. Yasukuni as a symbol, thus, possesses a 
relatively low level of contention in young Japanese people’s collective memory. 
Furthermore, it is evident that young people are less inclined to possess a collective 
memory of Japan’s role in the war as one of aggression. This is a narrative purported by 
the Yūshūkan which presents the war as one of self-defence and liberation and in 
doing so elicits collective forgetting (Lee, 2018). It could also be concluded that 





The December 26 visit by Abe was made without any prior announcement from the 
Office of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. Yahoo News (2013) described 
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the event as: “an electric shock visit”. After leaving Yasukuni, Abe received the media 
and gave a statement citing his reasons for the visit which his office named, “Pledge for 
Everlasting Peace” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2013). He expressed that 
he had paid his respects to the souls of all of those who had fought for the country. 
Abe referred to the eirei, or ‘souls’, a total of six times throughout his statement, and 
alluded to ‘their sacrifice as enabling the success of Japan today’ a total of five times 
(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2013). In a sense, the repetition of such 
themes is an attempt to produce verbal somatic markers. In the following remark from 
Abe’s statement, the concept of the ‘dead among the living’ is clearly evident and 
provides emotive references to familial relationships: 
 
The peace and prosperity we enjoy today is built on the precious 
sacrifices of numerous people who perished on the field wishing for 
the happiness of their loving wives and children, and thinking about 
their fathers and mothers who raised them. Today, I have 
contemplated on this, and paid my deepest respects and gratitude on 
my visit. (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2013) 
 
Here, Abe is eliciting the eirei and the family in collective memory so as to make his 
visit understandable and relatable to the public. His repeated references to the eirei 
affirms the concept of the war dead being a ‘possession of the nation’ whom need to be 
respected and shown gratitude. These remarks bear striking similarity to the visitor 
comments of the Yūshūkan in their gratitude for the sacrifices of the war dead, as well 
as the references to these sacrifices enabling the peace enjoyed today. These verbal 
somatic markers are used as justification for the visit while also producing a forgetting 
of the issue of war criminal enshrinement.   
 
After leaving the main shrine, Abe had subsequently visited the chinreisha (spirit 
pacifying shrine) located next to Yasukuni. In his post-visit statement Abe mentioned 
his desire to show: “respect to those, regardless of nationality, who lost their lives in 
the war but have not been enshrined at Yasukuni” (ANN News, 2013). Abe’s reference 
to non-Japanese victims produces a collective memory which purports that ‘war itself 
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is the enemy’ (Sneider, 2016). This also elicits forgetting by downplaying the acts of 
aggression and associated crimes while abrogating Japan’s war responsibility. In this 
way, he is shaping his statement so as to primarily emphasise his paying of respect for 
the war dead as justification for the visit, while also pre-empting criticism from the 
likes of South Korea and China. Abe attempted to forestall international vexation by 
expressing the following in his statement: 
 
Regrettably, it is a reality that the visit to Yasukuni Shrine has become 
a political and diplomatic issue. […] It is not my intention at all to hurt 
the feelings of the Chinese and Korean people. It is my wish to […] 
build friendship with China and Korea with respect, as did all the 
previous Prime Ministers who visited Yasukuni Shrine. (Prime 
Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2013) 
 
In doing so, Abe further espouses collective forgetting and focuses rather on cordial 
international relations and reconciliatory statements. His justification for the visit is 
further validated by referencing previous visits by Japanese Prime Ministers.  
 
Consequently, Abe’s visit did draw reprimand from the Korean and Chinese 
governments due to the perceived collective forgetting of Japan’s aggression during 
World War Two. Yasukuni Shrine is known in the two countries as the ‘War Criminals 
Shrine’ (Higurashi, 2013). The response was particularly pronounced in China due to 
escalations in the Senkaku/Diaoyu4 territorial dispute with Japan since 2012 (Dreyer, 
2017). The Chinese foreign ministry responded by issuing a statement expressing that: 
“[the visits are] an effort to glorify Japanese militaristic history of external invasion and 
colonial rule [and] to challenge the outcome of World War Two” (Higurashi, 2013).  
The visit was widely condemned by other governments, including from United States 
President Barack Obama (Mainichi Shimbun, 2013). Yasukuni’s divisive nature, and the 
forgetting it produces, is thus affectual domestically and internationally.  
 
                                               
4 Three uninhabited islets in the Western Pacific claimed by both China and Japan. 
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Abe’s visit shows that the narrative displayed at the Yūshūkan, and represented 
through symbol of Yasukuni, is one with which he himself and his government have no 
issue. The timing of his visit coincided with a comparatively high approval rating at 
55.7 per cent and was reported as likely a move to secure more support from the 





The reaction to Abe’s visit was varied in the Japanese media. National broadcasting 
organization, NHK, reported the story by stating only the basic details of the visit and 
running a clip in its news broadcast of Abe’s comments without any interpretation or 
critique (Kimura, 2013). NHK had previously been accused of censorship of war history 
when Abe told the Asahi Shimbun newspaper that he had been successful in the 
cancelling of a documentary about “comfort women” on its network (Laurence, 2005). 
This demonstrated NHK’s, and Abe’s, attempt to shape collective memory in public 
debate by eliciting collective forgetting of the Yasukuni controversy stemming from 
the enshrinement of war criminals and the revisionist history of Yūshūkan (Schwartz, 
1991). Other media outlets, however, were much more comprehensive in their 
coverage. 
 
TBS conducted a survey two days after the visit on December 28. The large sample of 
40,717 people showed that a majority 71.2 per cent (28,977) of respondents approved of 
Abe’s visit as opposed to 28.8 per cent (11,740 ) disapproving (Kimura, 2013). Compared 
to the aforementioned pre-visit Asahi survey, the TBS sample size was approximately 
eight times larger and showed a marked increase in positive reactions. This was further 
affirmed by a survey conducted by Yahoo News (2013) which indicated that 80 per cent 
of respondents thought that the visit was ‘reasonable’. The results of a survey by Sankei 
News, however, showed that just over half of respondents in their twenties and thirties 
approved of the visit at 50.6 per cent; a higher proportion than those forty and above at 
38.1% (Sankei News, 2014).  
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The degree to which Abe’s comments shaped people’s opinions is unclear but 
considering the similarities of his remarks to the visitor comments at the Yūshūkan, it 
can be assumed that the concepts of ‘dead among the living’ and collective forgetting 
influenced people’s perceptions of Yasukuni and the visit itself, particularly among the 
young. 
 
Conversely, on December 28 and 29, Kyodo News conducted a survey asking whether 
Abe’s visit to Yasukuni was good or bad. This showed contrasting results to those of 
the other surveys. The majority of respondents believed the visit to be bad. While the 
sample size is not given, 47.1 per cent of respondents stated that the visit was bad 
compared to 43.2 per cent stating it was good. Paradoxically, a follow-up question in 
the same survey asking, “Is consideration to diplomatic relations necessary or 
unnecessary?” showed that a majority 68.9 per cent agreed that it was necessary as 
opposed to 25.3 per cent stating it was unnecessary (Kimura, 2013).  
 
This demonstrates that national recognition of Japan’s war dead is generally prioritised 
over the desire among Japanese people to maintain good relations with neighbouring 
countries. It shows that the collective memory produced by the symbol, narrative, and 
eirei of the Yasukuni site, while contested, is primarily accepted by the population and 
that recognition of this by the head of state is largely valued. This collective memory 
has elicited a sense that forgoing warm relations with China and Korea is a worthy 
sacrifice in order to commemorate the war dead. A sense of national belonging and 
identity are, thus, produced. This is likely the intention of Abe’s visit. In doing so, the 
collective memory around Yasukuni is affirmed and becomes ever more linked to a 
sense of being ‘Japanese’. It demonstrates that public debate around Yasukuni can be 





The public debate around Abe’s visit exposed contestation among the Japanese 
population regarding the memory of the war. It also had a significant effect on Japan’s 
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international relations. Nikkei News reported that Abe’s decision to visit Yasukuni will 
make it difficult to improve already tense relations with China and South Korea, just as 
it did when Koizumi visited in 2001-2006 (Nippon Keizai Shimbun, 2013). Following 
the visit the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: “For a while, Sino-
Japanese and Korea-Japanese relations will not be functional”, demonstrating the 
affective nature of collective war memory in those countries and the disapproval of 
Japan’s perceived forgetting (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013).  
 
 
Within Japan, challenges were made against the legality and constitutionality of the 
visits. In the Osaka High Court, a group of citizens claimed that Abe’s visit was a 
violation of Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution which enshrines the separation of 
religion and state (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 1947). The plaintiffs 
numbered 388 in total and included family members of war dead, some whom have 
their relatives enshrined at Yasukuni (Mainichi Shimbun, 2017). In February 2017, the 
Court rejected the case because: “no violation of plaintiffs’ rights can be 
acknowledged”, however it did not issue a ruling on the constitutionality of Abe’s visit 
(Mainichi Shimbun, 2017). The plaintiffs submitted an appeal to the Supreme Court 
but the case was rejected in December 2017 (Kyodo News, 2018).  
 
In 2018, a similar case was presented to the Tokyo High Court by some 450 citizens, 
including family members of war dead. The plaintiffs stated that: “[the visit] has 
heightened international tensions and infringed their right to live their lives 
peacefully.”(Kyodo News, 2018). In October 2018, this Court also rejected the case. At 
the time of writing, however, the plaintiffs are intending to appeal the ruling (Kyodo 
News, 2018).  
 
These two cases demonstrate that the collective war memory held by the plaintiffs is 
markedly different than that espoused by Abe and Yasukuni. The visit challenged the 
collective memory of these groups and thus their identity. The memory of the family 
members of the war dead was able to be drawn on by all of the individuals in the group 
to create a shared identity (Halbwachs & Coser, 1992). The ‘collection’ of memories of 
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the plaintiffs produced an identity which enabled them to present a challenge to the 
contrasting collective memory that Yasukuni portrays.  
 
The visit brought to light the differences in the collective memory of ‘the family’, and 
the sensitivities that certain families have about relatives being enshrined in a place 
without their consent. It can be assumed that this lack of control over how the 
memory and commemoration of their loved ones is conducted is disagreeable with a 
sizeable number of bereaved families. The shaping of the collective memory of the war 
dead at Yasukuni, therefore, produces a sense of national identity in some, and 





Since 2013, Abe has not visited Yasukuni and in 2017 and 2018 neither he nor any 
ministers of his cabinet paid a visit to the shrine. On August 15, 2018, however, over 50 
members of his government visited on the anniversary of the end of World War Two 
(NHK, 2018). This demonstrates that while the top leadership currently refrain from 
visiting to avoid political and diplomatic ramifications, the collective memory of a 
sizeable number of politicians is still shaped by Yasukuni.  
 
In 2017 and 2018, Abe sent his special advisor, Masahiko Shibayama, to represent him 
at Yasukuni and issue a statement on his behalf. On both occasions Abe stated: “I am 
sorry I am unable to visit Yasukuni, please pray for the spirits our predecessors.”, again 
eliciting the concept of the eirei, and the war dead as possessions of the nation (NHK, 
2018). Incidentally, during the period since his 2013 visit, Abe’s approval ratings have 
dropped significantly, due in part to his proposals of constitutional amendment to 







Abe’s reasons for his affinity with Yasukuni centre around the remembering of the 
eirei, their enabling Japan’s peace and prosperity, and the pledge to never wage war 
again. His also stated his recognising of the sacrifices and contributions which current 
service men and women give to Japan. This can be linked to the collective memory, 
presented at Yasukuni and Yūshūkan around the eirei and their sacrifices. It shows 
how the national trauma of mourning the dead in a defeated country can be shaped to 
glorify the war dead and furthermore connect their deaths to the contemporary 
national security situation. 
 
This, however, produces significant collective forgetting of the war criminal 
enshrinement, the aggression and associated atrocities committed by the Imperial 
Army, and the abnegation of Japan’s war responsibility through historical revision. The 
public debate around Abe’s visit showed the divisive nature of the collective memory 
of Yasukuni. While support for its narrative is growing among young people, it is likely 












Chapter 4: Hiroshima 
 
“Memories of the atomic bombing have produced narratives of 




This chapter analyses the role the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and the associated 
Peace Memorial Museum plays in Japan’s collective memory beginning with the 
history of the city, the development of the “Spirit of Hiroshima”, interpretation of 
symbols within the park, collective forgetting and the role of peace museums, 
Hiroshima’s museum content, and concluding with analysis of visitor comments. 
Through this chapter focus will be given to three main aspects of the collective 
memory associated with Hiroshima; peace promotion and preservation, victimhood, 
and collective forgetting. This will contribute to an understanding of how the 
collective memory of Hiroshima contributes to a sense of national identity and 
belonging among Japanese people. Emphasis on the promotion of peace and the stories 
of the survivors is an integral part of this memory and has resulted in the collective 
forgetting of Japan’s war responsibility and pre-bomb history. This has created a sense 





With the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki culminating in the end of the 
Second World War, a new aspect to warfare was born. On August 7, 1945, the Daily 
Express in London wrote of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima the previous day: “[it is] a 
revolutionary weapon destined to change war, or which may even be the 
 46 
instrumentality to end all wars.” (Thomas, 1945, p. 1). In Hiroshima alone, over 200,000 
people died as a result of the single atomic bomb (Naono, 2005). Following Japan’s 
defeat, the two decimated cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki began to play an active 
role in promoting nuclear disarmament internationally. Only a decade after the 
bombings, the local governments of each municipality inaugurated the construction of 
public spaces, parks, and museums which were dedicated to the memory of the nuclear 
attacks and their aftermath in order to promote peace (den Dungen, 2006). This was a 
concerted effort to preserve the memory of the atomic bombing through public spaces 
and mnemonic devices.  
 
In 1949, Japan’s first ever public referendum was conducted which passed the 
Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law with over 90% support (City of 
Hiroshima, 2000). The purpose of this law is encompassed in Article 1: “It shall be the 
object of the present law to provide for the construction of the city of Hiroshima as a 
peace memorial city to symbolize the human ideal of sincere pursuit of genuine and 
lasting peace.”(City of Hiroshima, 2000, p. 2). In its explanation of this article, the 
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) stated that: “All peoples 
throughout the world seek genuine and lasting peace as an ideal. The intent of this law 
was to construct Hiroshima as a city that symbolizes lasting peace and Japan’s 
renunciation of war.” (UNITAR, 2018). The overwhelming support of the law 
demonstrates the salience of the bombing in collective memory among the population 
and the symbolism of Hiroshima to the promotion of peace. Following the result of the 





The former Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotion Hall was one of the only 
buildings in the central city that remained largely intact following the dropping of the 
bomb. After the War it was threatened with demolition, however due to the efforts of 
citizens, it was preserved (City of Hiroshima, 2000). In 1950, the building was named 
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the Genbaku (atomic bomb) Dome and was designated as an historic site by the City of 




The preservation of sites of historical importance is significant for remembering and 
promoting peace as Young (1998, p. 12) states: “In our hurry to forget and move on we 
are in danger of denial – or at least cosmetic tidying up. This too is a task of peace 
museums and peace culture.”. The Genbaku Dome now stands as a visual reminder to 
the world of the destruction that nuclear weapons can cause. International recognition 
was afforded when, in 1996, it was designated a World Heritage site by UNESCO 
(UNESCO, 2018). This affirmed the importance of the Genbaku Dome as a symbol of 
the global collective memory of Hiroshima. UNESCO (2018) states that: “[The Genbaku 
Dome] maintains its functional and spiritual authenticity as a place for prayer for 
world peace and the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons.” The site became an 
integral part of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park which by 1955 included the Peace 
Memorial Hall, Museum, Cenotaph for the A-bomb Victims and the City, as well as 
numerous other monuments (City of Hiroshima, 2000), shown in figure 6. The Park as 
Figure 5 - Genbaku Dome. Image taken by the author in August 2014 
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a whole has been instrumental to the development of the collective memory of 
Hiroshima. 
 
Spirit of Hiroshima  
 
Maurice Halbwachs (1992, p. 52) stated that: “every collective memory has unfolded 
within a spatial framework”. These spatial frameworks are best understood through the 
analysis of public spaces. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law was a 
concerted effort to produce societal remembrance through mnemonic devices (Jacobs, 
2003). Halbwachs and Coser (1992, p. 54) also stated that: “place and group each 
received the imprint of the other”. By applying this idea to Hiroshima, the construction 
of the park has made the post-war society in Japan “conscious of itself” through its own 
construction of the past (Jacobs, 2003, p. 255). This collective memory manifests most 
clearly during the commemoration of events. Commemoration ceremonies are held 
every year in Hiroshima on August 6th; the anniversary of the dropping of the first 
atomic bomb. The preservation of the past is achieved through the re-creation of it in 
such memorials and commemorations (Halbwachs & Coser, 1992)  
Figure 6 - Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. Image downloaded from www.googleearth.com/web in January 2019 
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Hiroshima’s past has produced a collective memory which is embodied in the so-called 
‘Spirit of Hiroshima’. One which denounces all war, nuclear weapons and conflict, and 
upholds the preservation of the memory of Hiroshima in order to maintain and spread 
peace (Naono, 2005). The various monuments in the Peace Park represent links 
between the collective memory of victimhood and the promotion of peace (Lee, 2018). 
 
 
4.2 Semiotics and Mnemonic Devices 
 
Symbolic places within the Peace Memorial Park, such as the Genbaku dome, shape 
the collective memory of Hiroshima’s past. This localization of collective memory has 
an effect not only on the citizens of the city but also outsiders as well. Visitors are 
influenced by the collective memory elicited through the mnemonic devices of statues 
and memorials within the park. Through semiotics, the development of the ‘Spirit of 
Hiroshima’, and the collective memory it imbues, can be interpreted.  
 
Statue of Mother and Child in the Storm 
 
In front of the main building of the Peace Memorial Museum, next to the Fountain of 
Peace stands the ‘Statue of Mother and Child in the Storm’, shown in figure 7. The 
Figure 7 - Statue of Mother and Child in the Storm. Image downloaded from www.hiroshima-navi.or.jp 
in December 2018 
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Hiroshima Convention & Visitors Bureau (2018) states that: “The feelings of Hiroshima 
citizens in wishing for peace are expressed in this statue.”. It was erected in 1960 with 
profits from fundraising efforts by the Hiroshima City Federation of Regional Women’s 
Organizations (City of Hiroshima, 2018). The group explains their purpose in the 
choice of this symbol as follows: 
 
 
A mother cradles her baby tightly in her right arm. With her left arm 
she tries to lift another child, clinging to her, on her back. She stands 
in the eye of a storm, taking a strong step forward as her upper body 
leans down. Her muscular body signifies the power of a mother’s love. 
As mothers of Hiroshima, we hope to erect this statue to express our 
determination to eliminate nuclear weapons and convey a silent 




The statue has become a site for the gathering of women from Hiroshima to show their 
stand against nuclear weapons. Every year on August 6, the groups lay origami paper 
cranes at the base of the statue, a Japanese symbol of peace (Hiroshima Peace 
Memorial Museum, 2018).  
 
 
This is a mnemonic device which presents emotive elements to the viewer in order to 
affect their memory of the atomic bombing. Its location in front of the museum 
prompts a sense of civilian affection in war. By physicalising women and children in 
the statue, the indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons can be elicited in the viewer. 
In this way, it is instrumental in ‘formulating meaning’ to the site and indicates 
Hiroshima people’s interpretation of the past (Schwartz, 1991). It allows the suffering 
and destruction of the innocent victims of Hiroshima to be embodied (Sakamoto, 




Sadako Sasaki and the Children’s Peace Monument 
 
One of the most well-known stories to have come out of Hiroshima is that of Sadako 
Sasaki. Her story is used to shape the collective memory of Hiroshima and promote 
peace, particularly among children. In 1958, a statue of Sadako was unveiled in the 
Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park (Sarig, 2009). She holds a paper crane over her head 
with a monument beneath the statue named “the Tower of a Thousand Cranes” (City 
of Hiroshima, 2001), shown in figures 8 and 9. The site has become a symbol of peace 
for children across Japan. 
 
Sadako was a two-year-old girl in 1945 when the atomic bomb exploded and, 
unbeknownst to her and her family, was consequently exposed to harmful levels of 
radiation (Sarig, 2009). For 10 years Sadako showed no signs of radiation exposure. In 
1955, however, she was hospitalised after suddenly falling ill. It was determined that 
Sadako had contracted leukaemia due to her exposure to high levels of radiation in the 
early years of her life (Sarig, 2009). Upon her diagnosis, Sadako decided to fold origami 
cranes from her hospital bed. In Japan, folded origami paper cranes represent long life 
and her hope was that the folding of 1000 cranes would cure her illness (Coerr & 
Figure 8 - Statue of Sadako Sasaki. Image downloaded from 
www.hiroshima-navi.com in January 2019 
Figure 9 - Children's Peace Monument. Image downloaded 
from www.japantimes.co.jp in January 2019 
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Himler, 1979). Her efforts were in vain, however, and she passed away after eight 
months in hospital.  
 
Sadako’s classmates were shocked with her death and began to fundraise and received 
donations from children all over the world (Sarig, 2009). From this story, the folded 
origami cranes came to symbolise not only long life, but also peace (City of Hiroshima, 
2001). Sadako’s life became symbolic of the suffering of the hibakusha (atomic bomb 
survivors). The hibakusha are integral to the collective memory of Hiroshima and 
remain avid promoters of peace and the total abolition of nuclear weapons 
(Yamaguchi, 2002). 
 
This memorial adds physical significance to the collective memory of victimhood. It 
demonstrates the indiscriminate nature of atomic weapons and reaffirms the memory 
of the innocent casualties which the bombing produced. Sadako’s story is taught to 
school children across Japan as well as in the Peace Memorial Museum with exhibits 
displaying some of the original paper cranes which she folded herself (Hiroshima 
Peace Memorial Museum, 2018). Located in the Peace Memorial Park between the 
Genbaku dome and the Peace Memorial Museum, the site has been designated as the 
‘Children’s Peace Monument’(City of Hiroshima, 2001). It is continually adorned with 
large piles of folded paper cranes which are sent to the site from children across Japan 
and other countries (City of Hiroshima, 2001). The monument has contributed 
significantly to Hiroshima’s promotion of peace. 
 
 
4.3 Collective Forgetting 
 
Museums of Peace 
 
By the mid 1990s, Japan housed one third of peace museums worldwide. This was the 
result of municipal and prefectural government decisions to promote peace (den 
Dungen & Yamane, 2015). Non-governmental bodies also established peace museums, 
such as Ritsumeikan University’s Kyoto Museum for World Peace. These privately-run 
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museums show balanced narratives around the war, particularly pertaining to the 
atrocities and aggression of the Japanese during the Asia-Pacific War (Ritsumeikan 
University, 2015). Publicly-run peace museums, however, such as the Hiroshima Peace 
Memorial Museum, present a much more muted history of Japan’s belligerency. 
 
Young (1998, p. 6) stated that: “Peace museums are not about memorializing, but 
about remembering. Understanding imagery is a crucial part of this.”. Their displays of 
the damaging effects of war on populations therefore serve to aid remembrance of the 
victims rather than memorialising their sacrifices (Young, 1998). This contrasts to 
military museums, such as the Yūshūkan, which serve to memorialise the dead and 
present them as sacrifices to the nation. They are henceforth shown gratitude for 
enabling the peace enjoyed today. Peace museums, however, stress ‘remembering’ as 
opposed to the passive memorialising of the dead as sacrifices (Young, 1998). They are 
effective in creating a memory of ‘being there’ by constructing a history which helps 
trigger cultural and philosophical reflection (Young, 1998). This is achieved through 
presenting large-scale displays of the time period including videos, photographs, and 
personal possessions, as well as somatic markers, to elicit emotion. This content can be 
updated and altered depending on contemporary circumstances (Halbwachs & Coser, 
1992). In the process, some peace museums create inequitable displays of history and 
produce collective forgetting. The malleability of museum content, thus, enables 
fluidity in historical interpretation. As regularly frequented institutions, museums are 





Since the 1990s, many peace museums have presented war histories of Japan as an 
assailant (Yamane, 2017). The degree to which detail is given about Japan’s aggressive 
past, however, varies widely. Privately-run museums are much more courageous in 
their displays of wartime history. The Kyoto Museum for World Peace, for example, 
widened the purpose of peace museums by detailing Japan’s aggressive militarism 
(Yamane, 2017). Its exhibits of the so-called “Fifteen Years War” (1931-1945), display 
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macabre evidence of the military’s misconduct in Asian and Pacific countries 
(Ritsumeikan University, 2015). In the process, public discussion about denial, guilt, 
and war responsibility has ensued and enabled Japanese citizens who visit these 
museums to attain more accurate knowledge of their nation’s wartime history (den 
Dungen & Yamane, 2015). The museums’ factual and impartial portrayal of the Fifteen 
Years War has somewhat contributed to reconciliation, peace, and trust-building 
among countries in the wider region who were subjected to Japanese war crimes (den 
Dungen, 2006). These open and accurate narratives of the war, however, have received 
much resistance and criticism from right-wing groups and conservative factions, such 
as Nippon Kaigi. They dispel and dispute the historical accuracy of the museums’ 
exhibits which has led to the revising of content.  
 
 
Museums Under Attack 
 
Since the early 2000s, nationalist groups in Japan have mounted pressure on numerous 
privately-run museums to either align their histories with revisionist narratives or face 
closure (den Dungen & Yamane, 2015). Rather than protecting the museums’ right to 
freedom of expression, the government has openly supported groups and institutions 
which silence them (Birdwhistell, 2017). As a result, collective forgetting has increased 
(Birdwhistell, 2017). This forgetting has had a significant effect on the freedom of peace 
museums across Japan to display objective and balanced histories of the war (Yamane, 
2010).  
 
In 2015, former Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto founded the nationalist party, Ishin no 
Kai (Japan Restoration Party), in a bid to reclaim Japan’s “national values” and 
“patriotic spirit” (Gibson, 2016). Hashimoto had received notoriety in 2013 for his 
statement that the forced sexual enslavement of tens of thousands of Korean and 
Chinese women, so-called “comfort women”, by the Imperial Japanese army was 
“necessary” (Asahi Shimbun, 2013). During his mayoral term (2011-2015) Hashimoto put 
pressure on Osaka’s International Peace Centre to revise their displays of Japan’s 
wartime past (Sankei News, 2015). The museum’s exhibition dedicated to the Fifteen 
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Year War (1931-1945) gave detailed explanations of the atrocities committed by the 
Japanese military on subjugated peoples in Asia, including the enslavement of the 
“comfort women” (Seaton, 2015). Hashimoto gave an ultimatum to the museum 
threatening closure if the exhibitions were not revised. The museum succumbed to 
pressure from Ishin no Kai and decided to revise its exhibition halls (Seaton, 2015). 
After a year of renovations, the museum reopened and no longer displays any reference 
to Japan’s history of aggression or victimisation (Gibson, 2016).  
 
Japan’s so-called “History Problem” is in part due to the numerous versions of history 
displayed within its museums (Yamane, 2017). The Japanese government views the 
country’s victimhood from the atomic bombings to be mutually exclusive to the 
collective memory of Japan’s aggression (Birdwhistell, 2017). Professor Kazuyo Yamane 
(2017) of Kochi University commented that students who enrol in peace studies at 
Japanese universities are often shocked to learn of the aggressive history of Japan 
during the Asia-Pacific War. This is largely a result of school textbooks lacking 
adequate historical detail. Rather than teaching factual history about Japan’s 
aggression, emphasis is put on the teaching of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki which thus spreads victim consciousness among school children (Yamane, 
2017). This same narrative is propagated by the Peace Memorial Museum in Hiroshima. 
 
 
4.4 The Hiroshima Peace Museum 
 
In 1955, when the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum was opened, its stated purpose 
was: “[to] convey to the peoples of all countries the reality of the damage inflicted by 
the atomic bomb, and contribute to the achievement of nuclear abolition and lasting 
world peace, which is the spirit of Hiroshima.” (Hataguchi, 1998, p. 46). The Museum 
was created as a place to remind people of the past and to preserve the future for 
lasting peace. The A-bomb Materials Preservation Association gathered artefacts from 
residents to be displayed in the museum. It stayed in its original state until 1975 when 
the first large-scale renovations were conducted with exhibits also being redesigned 
(Naono, 2005).  
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Content shaping Victimhood 
 
The shaping of the ‘Spirit of Hiroshima’ is evident in the revisions to the exhibitions of 
the Peace Museum. It produces a ‘victim consciousness’ which is enabled, in part, due 
to the lack of evidence of Japanese war crimes. This history is often introduced in the 
passive voice and, in doing so, the Japanese leadership and military are absolved of, 
“any responsibility in instigating, accelerating and maintaining wartime belligerence 
and colonization” (Giamo, 2003, p. 708). The result is a collective forgetting of Japanese 
bellicosity during the Second World War.  
 
In 1994, the second large-scale renovations took place and the former memorial hall 
was integrated into the main museum. (Naono, 2005). A 360-degree view of the 
destruction of Hiroshima City after the dropping of the bomb was installed in the main 
exhibition hall. This creates for the visitor, a sense of ‘being there’ in 1945 in the 
aftermath of the bombing (Young, 1998). The main building also purports to show 
what happened in Hiroshima through artefacts, photographs, and personal belongings 
of the victims (Naono, 2005). This elicits a collective memory centred around ‘victim 
consciousness’ by demonstrating aspects of the bombings which were damaging to 
civilian life and presenting Japan as the first ‘victim’ of the nuclear age (Murakami, 
1998). It promotes peace by graphically showing the visitor the morbid aftereffects of 
the bombings and the harm nuclear weapons can cause if used in warfare (Hataguchi, 
1998). In this narrative, the Japanese are victims of war, rather than responsible 
participatory assailants in it (Murakami, 1998) 
 
The East Building contains displays relating to the history of Hiroshima before the 
bomb was dropped, the development of the atomic bomb and the nuclear age, the 
dropping of the bomb itself, and the city’s peace promotion activities (Naono, 2005). 
At the time of writing, this building is currently being renovated and is scheduled to 
reopen in the spring of 2019 (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, 2018). After 
renovating the East Building (the former Peace Memorial Hall), the site reopened in 
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April 2017 and the building now displays video testimonies from hibakusha (Hiroshima 





Hibakusha have been instrumental to the shaping of collective memory of Hiroshima. 
The museum contains facilities for students to come and hear first-hand experiences 
from the hibakusha volunteers. They share their stories and show documentary films 
of footage taken after the bombing. Through the hibakusha, students and visitors can 
learn of the effects of atomic warfare by their teaching of the indiscriminate nature of 
nuclear weapons (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, 2018). One of the museum’s 
displays shows the three phases of a nuclear explosion; all of which were experienced 
by the hibakusha. These are: the heat rays, blast and shockwave, and the subsequent 
effects of radiation on those exposed; an aspect unique to nuclear weapons.  
 
The exhibits also document the cases of leukaemia and cancers experienced by 
hibakusha, which saw a marked increase in the months, years, and decades following 
the bombing (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, 2018). In order to portray this 
aspect of nuclear weapons, the museum displays things such as lost hair, photographs 
of keloid scars, and other radiated objects. Victims and hibakusha shown in these 
displays are used as somatic markers to elicit sympathy and sorrow. These are often 
accompanied by stories in order to make it comprehensible and relatable to the visitor 
(Murakami, 1998).  
 
Many hibakusha have been active in passing on negative war experiences to younger 
people at the museum. In doing so, they perform a vital social function. The passing on 
of their memories teaches successive generations the importance of nonviolence. This 
collective shared pain of the war allows recognition of the significance of peace (Chen, 
2012). These negative memories, however, focus mainly on suffering and thus elicit a 
sense of victimhood (Murakami, 1998). The collective forgetting that results enables 
                                               
5 Atomic bomb survivor/victim 
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the visitors to feel a sense of affinity and solidarity with the hibakusha. For Japanese 





Biannually the museum holds exhibitions. The museum states that the exhibitions are 
to: “help people understand more deeply certain aspects of the atomic bomb damage, 
the tragedy of war, and the sanctity of peace.” (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, 
2018). The city and its museum have produced a collective memory not only within 
Japan but also overseas of the horrors of nuclear warfare. It has used this memory to 
appeal to support for the abolition of nuclear weapons around the world. The museum 
also states that: “Seeing this will convince you, we hope, of the foolishness of 
continuing to develop nuclear weapons” (Hataguchi, 1998). This clearly shows the 
museum’s objective to shape collective memory of the bomb among visitors. 
 
Visitor numbers to the museum have remained steady over the years, an ever-
increasing proportion of which from overseas. In 2015, the museum saw a record high 
number of 340,000 foreign visitors (Lee, 2018). In 2017, the museum recorded a total 
number of 1.6 million visitors passing through its doors (Nippon News, 2017). After 
viewing the exhibits, patrons are encouraged to write their thoughts in the visitor’s 
book.   
 
 
4.5 Visitor Comments: 
 
In 2005, the museum published a book entitled: “What Hiroshima Asks of Us: From 
the ‘Dialogue Notebooks’ of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum” (Hiroshima 
Peace Memorial Museum, 2018). The curator of the museum, Hironobu Ochiba stated 
that the comments were selected to ensure a variety of backgrounds and perspectives 
(Chen, 2012). From the 920 comment books which the museum had amassed, 325 
comments were chosen for the book (Chen, 2012). The comments are given by visitors 
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at the end of their visit to the museum. Information on the writers’ background, 
however, is often not given. Thus, while analysing the visitor comments is not a fair 
sample of the opinions of all of the visitors, it does offer a valuable insight into the 





In Chen’s (2012) analysis of the book, the amount of comments which expressed 
disapproval of nuclear weapons only numbered 8%, as opposed to 29% (the highest) 
expressing hope for peace. This reflects the aspect of peace promotion in Hiroshima’s 
collective memory. The majority of visitors expressed the importance of preserving the 
memory of the atomic bombing so that future generations can avoid the fate of a 
nuclear war and maintain peace (den Dungen, 2006). This can be seen in the following 
comments: 
 
I pray for peace. We don’t know what war is like. I hope all children in 
the future will not know a war. - High school student. 
 
I hope that this Memorial Museum will serve as a warning to future 
generations not to repeat the mistakes of the past. World peace 
through education seems to be an effective way to create a new 
generation that would make peace permanent. – USA. 
 
The victim consciousness is evident in the sorrow, shock, and anger elicited by the 
exhibitions for the innocent killing of civilians (Chen, 2012). It is presented by explicit 
displays of civilian injuries and are used as somatic markers to elicit emotional 
responses (Damasio et al., 1996). This aspect of victimhood is an integral aspect to 
Hiroshima’s collective memory. It can be seen in the following comments: 
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I cried in the museum. I shed tears not out of sympathy and sorrow 
but out of wrath. Don’t look away from human dishonour that brings 
death to innocent people. – High school student. 
 
We must avoid another such war as that at any cost. I pray for the 
repose of the victims. – Anonymous. 
 
While watching the materials in this museum, I was trembling all 
along. Let us pray for the repose of the victims. – Anonymous. 
 
These comments demonstrate the production of a sense of ‘dead among the living’ in 
the visitors (Sakamoto, 2015). The physical reactions to the exhibitions demonstrate 
the power of the somatic markers employed in the museum. This produces sympathy 
with the victims of the bombing and reflects the objectives of the museum to preserve 
the memory of the casualties. Only two comments from the book criticise the actions 
of Japan’s military and expose the collective forgetting which the museum produces. 
Both comments are from non-Japanese visitors and indicate the employment of 
victimhood in the museum:  
 
This museum seems to impress more the desires for pity for the 
Japanese. […] How about some [pity] for the surrendered victims of 
the dishonourable sneak attack on Pearl Harbor? – USA. 
 
The scene here is horrible. You can imagine what an atomic bomb can 
do. But considering what they did to people of South East Asian 
countries, I think, this scene is just the same there. Do you Japanese 
realize this? Have you seen what soldiers did to the people of our 
countries? No? – Malaysia. 
 
The comments thus reflect the different aspects to Hiroshima’s collective memory 
produced by the museum. They elicit in the visitor the hope for peace, sympathy and 





As the comments were selected by the curators and board of editors at their own 
discretion, the book also provides insight into the collective memory which the 
museum has aimed to manufacture. That the ‘hope for peace’ was the highest theme 
observed through the comments in the book represents fulfilment of museum’s 
objective. Observation of the effect that the museum has on visitors provides a 
valuable insight into the collective memory it elicits. Behind this effect is an 
inextricable connection to a sense of national victimhood as Lee (2018, p. 18) purports: 
“Hiroshima stands firmly as the premier icon of Japanese victimization. […] The overall 
message is presented in terms of the national trauma beyond the city’s struggle over 
the nuclear blast.”. The Peace Museum has been a crucial educational vehicle for the 
furthering of this narrative. This is inextricably tied to the notion of pacifism in post-
war Japanese culture. 
 
Since 2013, the Abe administration has proposed revising Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution which renounces Japan’s ability to wage war, and also called for a 
referendum on the issue in 2020. The justification for this is that it will improve Japan’s 
“overall security” in light of a more assertive China and hostile North Korea (Osaki & 
Kikuchi, 2017). If successful, this will, however, put Japan’s collective memory of the 
war, and its strong connection to pacifism, into question. This will likely result in a 
dramatic change to Japan’s external and internal identity (Bochat, 2008). Results of a 
2018 survey, however, show that over 60 per cent of respondents did not want 
amendment of Article 9, with approximately 30 per cent in favour (Cucek, 2018). While 
security and war are two different things, the results of this survey demonstrate the 
contested nature of war and peace among the Japanese population. It also presents 









The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park has allowed Japanese culture and identity to be 
closely linked to the notion of nonviolence through the employment of the ‘Spirit of 
Hiroshima’, symbols, collective forgetting, and the peace museum. Hiroshima’s 
narrative is vital to a Japanese sense of national belonging and identity. The collective 
memory centred around the atomic bombings has cultivated a strong bearing among 
the Japanese people for peace. This is reflected in Article 9 of the Japanese constitution 
which states that Japan will forever renounce war and the means to wage it (Prime 
Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 1947).  
 
The collective memory of Hiroshima is shown to have three main aspects: peace 
promotion, victimhood, and collective forgetting of Japan’s aggression and associated 
crimes. The peace aspect is imbued by the Peace Memorial Museum and Park, the 
victimhood is represented through the hibakusha and museum exhibitions, and the 
collective forgetting is a result of the central focus of the former two aspects in 
collective memory. This contributes to a strong sense of pacifism among Japanese 














Chapter 5: Obama’s Visit 
 
“Those who died, they are like us.” – Barack Obama  
 
5.1 The Visit 
 
On May 27, 2016, Barack Obama became the first sitting American President to visit 
Hiroshima in an official capacity (Sneider, 2016). He broke a history of presidents who 
have rejected visiting the city. This chapter analyses the shaping of collective memory 
through public debate before, during, and after Obama’s visit. The data for this 
analysis is sourced from surveys conducted by Japanese media organisations around 





From 2014 to 2016, the “Letters to Obama” campaign was conducted by the Hiroshima 
Television Corporation (2016) with participation from the prefectural government, City 
of Hiroshima, hibakusha, women’s groups, and children. Over the two years of the 
campaign 1,400 letters were compiled (Hiroshima Television Corporation, 2016). The 
purpose of the campaign was to explicitly express to Obama that the people of 
Hiroshima do not desire an apology for the bombing, but only urge the President to 
visit the city and see the truth.  
 
The majority of the letters were themed around peace as can be seen in the following 




Hiroshima citizens are heartfully waiting for your visit. We do not seek 
an apology; what Hiroshima wants is that you pray for the total 
abolition of nuclear weapons and the preservation of peace. 
 
We, the people of Hiroshima, do not want to debate whether the 
dropping of the bomb was right or not. We merely want the people of 
the world to see what happened here. 
 
For the sake of world peace, come to Hiroshima. 
 
Please write a new page of history in Hiroshima. 
 
These letters imbue the hope that Obama’s visiting Hiroshima will further the 
promotion of peace which the collective memory of Hiroshima is centred around. 
Their purpose is for Obama to come to Hiroshima and be shaped by the collective 
memory that it represents. The letters were personally delivered to the White House 
by the head of Hiroshima Television, Hideaki Miyama (Hiroshima Television 
Corporation, 2016). Obama subsequently announced his plans to visit Hiroshima in 





A survey of Hiroshima citizens prior to the visit showed overwhelming support for it 
with 92% of people in favour (Chūgoku Shimbun, 2016a). In the lead-up to the visit the 
Japanese media focussed much attention on the reaction to the announcement by the 
hibakusha, as well as speculation about the possibility of Obama apologising for the 
dropping of the bomb. The hibakusha are at the centre of the victim narrative around 
Hiroshima and are thus a living representation of the collective memory presented at 
the museum (Sneider, 2016). They have also been instrumental in movements for peace 
and the abolition of nuclear weapons so their opinion of the visit was given attention 
by the general population (Naono, 2005).  
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Kyodo News (2016) conducted a survey of 115 hibakusha from across Japan. The results 
showed that a large majority of the respondents were supportive of the visit by Obama. 
In answer to the question, “Do you want an apology from the President?” a majority 78 
per cent of hibakusha answered “no”. A follow up question asked, “What do you hope 
the President will do when he is in Hiroshima?”. A majority 76 per cent of hibakusha 
stated that they hoped Obama would visit the Peace Memorial Museum.  
 
Another survey of 200 Hibakusha was conducted by NHK (2016) around the same time. 
The results to this multiple answer questionnaire showed that a majority 88 per cent of 
respondents wanted Obama to visit the museum, and 81 per cent wanted him to lay a 
wreath for the victims of the bombing. The hopes of these hibakusha were fulfilled 
when Obama laid a wreath at the Flame of Peace in the Peace Memorial Park after his 
speech (Sneider, 2016). It is apparent through these actions, and also comments in 






The content of Obama’s speech demonstrates the influence of the collective memory 
of Hiroshima. While he was cautious not to denounce the decision by President Harry 
Truman to drop the atomic bomb in 1945, his references to the hibakusha and the 
victims in the following statement is clearly evident of Hiroshima’s collective memory: 
(Sneider, 2016)  
 
Someday, the voices of the hibakusha will no longer be with us to bear 
witness. But the memory of the morning of August 6, 1945, must never 
fade. That memory allows us to fight complacency. It fuels our moral 




Here, Obama affirms the importance of preserving the collective memory of the 
hibakusha so as to prevent the history of Hiroshima from being repeated. The visit 
itself demonstrates a shift in post-war collective memory surrounding Hiroshima.  
 
In the first few years after the bombing, the Japanese government itself placed blame 
solely on the wartime leadership (Sneider, 2016). Since the 1990s, however, a distancing 
from Japan’s war responsibility in lieu of defining the war as one of self-defence has 
grown (Yamane, 2017). This has coincided with a rise in the victimhood narrative 
presented at the Peace Memorial Museum in addition to peace promotion activities 
(Yamane, 2017). Nevertheless, while the conservative view of Japan fighting a war of 
self-defence still exists among certain nationalist groups and politicians, the dominant 
collective memory of victimhood remains to bolster the dominant pacifist narrative 
(Sneider, 2016). In the following remarks, Obama states that the responsibility for the 
war was not solely one country’s fault, but that the war was instigated due to man’s 
inhumanity to man: 
 
Empires have risen and fallen. Peoples have been subjugated and 
liberated. And at each juncture, innocents have suffered, a countless 
toll, their names forgotten by time. (Office of the Press Secretary, 2016) 
 
This therefore creates war as the enemy, rather than nations or people, and reflects the 
narrative presented at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. The people 
(‘innocents’) thus become victims of war. At the centre of this narrative is the 
hibakusha (Sneider, 2016). It teaches that rather than taking responsibility for the war, 
the actions of the wartime Japanese leadership, and the atrocities committed by the 
Imperial Army, the enemy is the war itself and the resulting destruction and suffering 
(Yamane, 2017). This is evident in Obama’s following statement: 
 
We see these stories in the Hibakusha. The woman who forgave a pilot 
who flew the plane that dropped the atomic bomb because she 




While there is no reason to claim that these statements are unjustified, in their effect 
they produce collective forgetting. By apportioning the blame on war, it abrogates any 
national responsibility and dispels any logic that consequential suffering of war is due 
to actions taken by the leadership of a nation. It bypasses legal consequences and goes 
outside that of individual or group control and responsibility (Halbwachs & Coser, 
1992). Obama’s remarks therefore reflect the victimization of Japan, while 
simultaneously repudiating his own country’s liability for the suffering induced by the 
atomic bombings. He also does not apologise for, or denounce, the decision to drop 
the bomb. This demonstrates his high level of political adept as it maintains the 
validity of the decision among the American population and in the same instance 
meets the expectations of the majority of the hibakusha and citizens who were not 
seeking an apology.  
 
In the following three statements, Obama elicits affinity from contemporary people 
with the victims who died in the bombing (Office of the Press Secretary, 2016). He 
alludes to Anderson and O’Gorman’s (2016) ‘imagined community’ that the museum 
has created:  
 
Their souls speak to us. They ask us to look inward, to take stock of 
who we are and what we might become. 
 
That is why we come to Hiroshima. So that we might think of people 
we love. The first smile from our children in the morning. The gentle 
touch from a spouse over the kitchen table. The comforting embrace 
of a parent. We can think of those things and know that those same 
precious moments took place here, 71 years ago. 
 
Hiroshima teaches us the truth. […] That is why we come to this place. 
We stand here in the middle of this city and for ourselves to imagine 
the moment the bomb fell. […] We listen to a silent cry. We remember 
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all the innocents killed. Mere words cannot give voice to such 
suffering.  
 
This notion of the dead existing among the living is a common theme seen in both the 
Peace Memorial Museum and the Yūshūkan. These references to the deceased are used 
as verbal somatic markers. This bears similarity to the remarks about the eirei given by 
Abe’s statement after visiting Yasukuni. Their intent is to elicit empathy and create a 
sense of ‘being there’, while immortalising the memory of the victims among 
contemporary people (Young, 1998). It elicits familial memories which is highly 
effective in producing empathy (Halbwachs & Coser, 1992). Obama’s use of 
Hiroshima’s collective memory served well to please the wishes of the hibakusha. His 
selectiveness in utilising the victim aspects and dead in his remarks shows that the 
collective memory of Japan could be utilised to aid his political standing. He balanced 
this viewpoint with references to: “thousands of Koreans, [and] a dozen Americans 
held prisoner.” who also perished in the bombing (Office of the Press Secretary, 2016). 
It demonstrated the employment of Hiroshima’s collective memory to avoid political 
ramifications from groups which would have felt disregarded.  
 
After his speech, Obama met with three Hibakusha selected to attend the ceremony by 
the Japanese government (Kadota, 2016). The selective nature and small number of 
individuals chosen demonstrates a shaping of the collective memory surrounding 
hibakusha by the government. Obama shook hands with all three hibakusha who 
officially attended and was photographed embracing one who was visibly upset 
(Kadota, 2016). Photos and footage of this moment were broadcast on nearly all of 
Japan’s media platforms as well as internationally (Miyatake, 2016). The hug physically 
shows Obama’s affirmation of the victim narrative and collective memory surrounding 
the hibakusha and victims of war.  
 
Obama subsequently viewed the statue to Sadako Sasaki with Prime Minister Abe 
before visiting the Peace Memorial Museum (Kadota, 2016). After viewing the 
museum’s exhibitions, Obama wrote the following in the visitors’ book: 
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We have known the agony of war. Let us now find the courage, 
together, to spread peace, and pursue a world without nuclear 
weapons. (Kyodo News, 2016).  
 
The visit to the park and museum had a significant impact on the people of Hiroshima 
and an overall reaction being mostly positive among Japanese people, yet contestation 





After Obama’s visit, Asahi Shimbun (2016) surveyed over 5,000 hibakusha across 
Japan6 about their thoughts on the event. The results showed a 72 per cent approval 
rating for the visit. The Chūgoku Shimbun (2016b), the largest newspaper in the 
greater Hiroshima region, also conducted a survey of local people asking a question 
with multiple-choice answers on the significance of Obama’s visit to Hiroshima. The 
results showed that 89.6 per cent of respondents viewed the visit positively with 44.8 
per cent thinking it was very significant, and 44.8 per cent thinking it was reasonably 
significant.  
 
The same newspaper conducted another multiple-choice survey asking respondents to 
select reasons as to why they thought Obama’s visit was constructive. The results 
showed that 75 per cent of respondents cited Obama’s laying of the wreath to the souls 
of the victims, followed by 44 per cent citing his remarks about the hibakusha, and 40 
per cent citing his visit to the Peace Memorial Museum (Chūgoku Shimbun, 2016b). 
This demonstrates the importance of the dead among the living in Hiroshima’s 
collective memory and the significance to the citizens of its recognition. The 
hibakusha and the peace museum are also integral aspects to this collective memory. 
Obama’s repeated referencing of the victims in his speech and subsequent meeting 
                                               
6 Total number of hibakusha as of March 2016 was 174,080.  
Nihon Hidankyo 2018, About Hidankyo, viewed December 10, 2018, 
<http://www.ne.jp/asahi/hidankyo/nihon/english/about/about1-01.html.>. 
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with hibakusha, as well as his visit to the peace museum garnered generally positive 
responses. This affirmed the collective memory of many Hiroshima citizens, and the 
wider Japanese population.  
 
Another survey of citizens of the Greater Hiroshima Area asked, “Should an apology be 
given to Hibakusha the next time an American President visits Hiroshima?”. The 
results showed that a majority of people did not seek an apology with 69.5 per cent 
answering “no” or “indifferent” and the remaining 30.5 per cent answering “yes” 
(Chūgoku Shimbun, 2016b).  
 
A subsequent survey of the five largest hibakusha associations across Japan, however, 
showed that the collective memory of the bomb remains contested among the 
survivors. The groups were asked to provide justified answers to the question, “Should 
an apology be given the next time an American President visits Hiroshima?”. The 
Nagasaki Hibakusha Association answered “yes” stating: “The atomic bomb was a 
weapon which indiscriminately killed many. The resulting effects of radiation, which 
are a unique characteristic of nuclear weapons, cannot be forgiven.” (Chūgoku 
Shimbun, 2016b). The Yasaorudzuru Hibakusha Association also answered “yes” and 
stated: “We cannot view positively any reason for the criminality of inflicting 
incomparable destruction on the world and its people.” The two groups which 
answered “no” gave reasons which reflected the majority of the hibakushas’ responses 
in the aforementioned surveys. The Aomori Prefectural Hibakusha Association 
answered “indifferent” stating: “It is no longer necessary to debate about an apology. 
Too much time has passed. Rather than an apology, we want to receive more 
leadership in the movement for the total abolition of nuclear weapons.” (Chūgoku 
Shimbun, 2016b) 
 
The results of this particular survey demonstrate that a number of different collective 
memories of the bomb exist among the hibakusha and that the memory of the bomb 
remains contested. Hibakusha groups were very active from the 1950s to the 1980s in 
holding the Japanese government to account for the suffering and aftereffects of the 
bombing. The Nihon Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers 
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Organizations), for example, states that: “Hidankyo has constantly demanded that the 
Japanese government should admit Japan’s state responsibility of launching the war, 
which eventually led to the atomic bombing.”(Nihon Hidankyo, 2018). Hidankyo’s 
efforts have led to the enactment of a number of laws for the medical treatment, 
support and assistance of hibakusha. Despite this, Hidankyo maintains that: “[the 
government] neither provides state compensation nor admits the war responsibility of 
the state.” (Nihon Hidankyo, 2018). This demonstrates a much more balanced 
collective memory which is less inclined to induce forgetting of Japan’s actions 
proceeding the bombing, or war responsibility, while still maintaining the memory of 
the suffering and destruction that the bomb caused. Since the 1990s, however, 
discussion of state accountability for the bombing has lessened among the majority of 
hibakusha groups in lieu of peace promotion (Yamane, 2017).   
 
Today, the majority of hibakusha do not seek the Japanese government’s contrition nor 
an apology from the American President. The dominant collective memory which they 
possess promotes peace through memorializing the effects and suffering of the victims. 
This narrative nevertheless elicits collective forgetting in the process. The mostly 
positive reaction to Obama’s visit demonstrated the prevalence of this narrative but 






In December 2016, Mainichi Shimbun (2016) published an article and picture of the 
thank you letter which the Peace Memorial Museum received from President Obama, 
shown in figure 10. In the letter, Obama reaffirms the suffering and example of the 
hibakusha and states that: “So long as more people take time to understand the past 
[…] a more peaceful future lies ahead.”  
  
This suggests that understanding the narrative of ‘the past’ presented at the museum 
will bring about peace. In doing so, Obama is inadvertently endorsing the collective 
 72 
forgetting produced by the museum’s exhibits and displays. In response, Museum 
Director Kenji Shiga stated: “One can sense from this written text that the President 
saw the harsh reality of the damage cause by the atomic bomb and is serious about 
looking into the eye of history. I am grateful.”(Mainichi Shimbun, 2016) 
 
Four months later, the museum unveiled a display dedicated to Obama’s visit, shown 
in figure 11. It exhibited four origami cranes which were folded by Obama himself (City 
of Hiroshima, 2017). These cranes demonstrate Obama’s commitment to the 
promotion of peace; an integral aspect of Hiroshima’s collective memory. By the 
museum creating a dedicated display to the visit, a shaping of the collective memory of 
Hiroshima can be observed. This is salient as this narrative is affirmed and validated by 
someone as significant as the American President. Nevertheless, it furthers collective 
forgetting about Japan’s aggression and war responsibility within the museum and 
suggests that the current displays are sufficient in presenting a contextualised history 
of bombing of Hiroshima.  
Figure 10 - Thank you letter from Barack Obama. Image 
downloaded from www.japantimes.co.jp in December 
2018 
Figure 11 - Obama's Hiroshima Visit Display. Image downloaded from 





The public debate around Obama’s visit to Hiroshima demonstrated the localisation of 
Hiroshima’s collective memory. The media attention focused mostly on the opinions of 
local people and hibakusha. It showed that the selection of questions in the surveys 
centred mainly around an apology or the thoughts of the hibakusha. In this way, the 
public debate shaped the collective memory to espouse the victim narrative. Due to 
the largely positive responses, the visit gained significance and affirmed Hiroshima’s 
place in the national consciousness. Nevertheless, this reaction prompted forgetting of 
Japan’s wartime aggression and disapproval from certain hibakusha groups. While this 
consternation was evident in the data, the dominance of the collective memory of 
victimhood is indisputable. Obama’s visit thus demonstrated the power and influence 















Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
The post-war collective memory of Japan remains contested. In the seven decades 
since Japan’s defeat, the way in which the country remembers its wartime history has 
produced differing and largely conflicting narratives. This study investigated the 
collective war memories represented at two sites of memorial in Japan; Yasukuni 
Shrine and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. The former presenting a collective 
memory which glorifies the war dead and praises their sacrifices to the nation, and the 
latter, a memorial to the victims of the atomic bombings and symbol for the promotion 
of peace and total abolition of nuclear weapons. In this sense, the two sites represent 
narratives of sacrifice to Japan which has ‘enabled its prosperity and peace today’. 
As comprehensive study of this nature is shown to be lacking, analysis of these sites 
has offered insight into the place they hold in society Japan’s collective memory, and 
the effect they have on a sense of nationhood and Japanese identity.  
 
The results have demonstrated that selective remembering induces forgetting. The 
utilising of death to evoke sentiment, emphasis on the victims of the war and their 
souls, apportioning blame on the war itself, and the eliciting of a sense of national 
pride have all produced significant collective forgetting of the aggression, atrocities, 
and victimisation of East Asian and Pacific peoples. The historical revisionism which 
has taken place means that successive generations will lack adequate knowledge of 
Japan’s expansionist past. The results affirmed that young people are more susceptible 
to adopting this revised version of history. In their forgetting, Yasukuni and Hiroshima 
work in tandem to further the narratives of war dead glorification, and victimhood 
which inadvertently serves nationalist causes. Significantly, the two sites have elicited 
national pride and a strong sense of ‘Japaneseness’ among visitors. 
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The visits of Abe and Obama show that collective memory is not just a societal issue, 
but one which is intertwined with politics as well. Yasukuni’s narrative received state 
validation, and Hiroshima’s received international recognition. Abe’s visit was 
evaluated to varying degrees, while Obama’s largely gained positive reactions. Results 
demonstrated, however, that the public debate around the visits exposed contestation 
of the collective memory associated with each site. The degree to which varying 
collective memories of the war are intrenched within different individuals and groups 
in Japanese society, will likely continue to influence the level of political association 
with the two sites. Contestation of collective memory will also persist in the process.  
 
It is natural that after experiencing the trauma of war, a nation wants to memorialise 
the death of millions of its people, and Japan is no exception. Nevertheless, in 
remembering certain things, we forget others. The use of this memory to selectively 
forget negative aspects of a country’s actions in wartime results in divisive versions of 
history and societal disaffection. It is important, however, to view history for what it is 
and to learn of the bad aspects of one’s country’s past. In doing so, a balance and 
perspective is gained which can safeguard future generations from repeating forgotten 
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